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Abstract 
“Cognitive control” describes endogenous guidance of behavior in situations 
where routine stimulus-response associations are suboptimal for achieving a desired 
goal. The computational and neural mechanisms underlying this capacity remain poorly 
understood. The present dissertation examines recent advances stemming from the 
application of a statistical, Bayesian learner perspective on control processes. An 
important limitation in current models consists of a lack of a plausible mechanism for 
the flexible adjustment of control over variable environments. I propose that flexible 
cognitive control can be achieved by a Bayesian model with a self-adapting, volatility-
driven learning scheme, which modulates dynamically the relative dependence on 
recent (short-term) and remote (long-term) experiences in its prediction of future control 
demand.  Using simulation data, human behavioral data and human brain imaging data, 
I demonstrate that this Bayesian model does not only account for several classic 
behavioral phenomena observed from the cognitive control literature, but also facilitates 
a principled, model-guided investigation of the neural substrates underlying the flexible 
adjustment of cognitive control. Based on the results, I conclude that the proposed 
Bayesian model provides a feasible solution for modeling the flexible adjustment of 
cognitive control. 
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1. Cognitive Control as Statistical Inference 
“Cognitive control” describes the ability to guide one’s behavior and mental 
states in line with internal goals. A key characteristic of cognitive control is thought to be 
flexibility: control processes must be capable of dynamically adapting (both qualitatively 
and quantitatively) to ongoing changes in the environment. How this type of contextual 
regulation of control occurs (in the absence of an all-knowing homunculus) is a key 
question in current cognitive psychology and neuroscience research. This dissertation 
attempts to address this question using a Bayesian approach, which behaves similar to 
the well-known reinforcement learning algorithms with a flexible learning rate (see 
below). Behavioral and brain imaging studies reported in this dissertation suggest that 
this Bayesian approach is not only able to simultaneously account for some key 
behavioral phenomena in the field of cognitive control, but also capable of guiding 
research to discover neural substrates underlying the flexibility in cognitive control. The 
structure of this dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter 1, I first review recent 
efforts in modeling the control processes using both Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
approaches. Based on the reviews, I then propose that Bayesian methods form a potent 
solution to model flexible cognitive control. Chapter 2 starts with detailed description of 
a novel Bayesian model for simulating flexible cognitive control and an experimental 
design that promotes flexible adjustment of cognitive control. The description is then 
followed by some proof-of-principle validations of the model using computer-generated 
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data based on the experimental design. Chapter 3 documents 3 behavioral studies to 
further validate the Bayesian model’s potential of accounting for several key behavioral 
phenomena. In chapter 4, I present a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
study that employs this Bayesian model to explore the neural basis underlying flexible 
cognitive control. In chapter 5, the key findings in this dissertation are summarized. 
Limitation and directions of future research are also discussed. 
1.1 Cognitive control as ‘guided’ information processing 
In interacting with our environment, we transform sensory input into internal 
representations and select cognitive or motor actions based on these representations and 
our current goals. Given the fact that there is an enormous amount of sensory 
information and many possible actions available in contrast to only a few desired 
responses, appropriate action selection is a difficult task. To simplify this task, stimuli 
and actions that are frequently paired become mnemonically associated (e.g., via 
Hebbian learning) into stimulus-response (S-R) ensembles (or pathways) or more 
complex and extended action schemas (Norman & Shallice, 1986) that facilitate prompt 
reaction. Because much sensory information is processed in different pathways in 
parallel but only few actions can (or should) be taken simultaneously, stimulus 
representations and S-R pathways are believed to compete for being selected to drive 
behavior (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
The results of this competition are largely driven by the strength of associative 
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pathways: stronger (i.e., more frequently activated) pathways are more likely to win the 
competition than weaker or novel ones. Once selected (and executed), the strength of a 
particular pathway may be reinforced or reduced depending on the assessment of how 
well the selected actions have fulfilled the organism’s intended goals (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998). 
This competition mechanism (or “contention scheduling”, see Norman & 
Shallice, 1986) can generate appropriate behavior in many situations, but strong, 
stereotyped pathways can also result in suboptimal and even hazardous actions in some 
situations. For example, a US citizen’s habitual driving on the right side of the road may 
have serious consequences when performed in the UK. In this case, a set of weaker or 
even novel associations (e.g., driving on the left side of the road) must be biased to win 
the competition in order to achieve the organism’s goals. This “top-down” biasing of 
information processing to favor goal-directed stimuli and actions is the essence of 
cognitive control (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 
2001). In present-day neuroanatomical models, cognitive control is closely tied to the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is proposed to harbor temporary representations of 
current goals, goal-relevant stimuli and strategies (Badre, 2008; M. M. Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Braver & Barch, 2002; Duncan, 2001; Fuster, 2008; 
Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). To 
implement control, representations of goals, context and related methods (like rules) are 
 4 
thought to be actively maintained in the PFC, which sends biasing signals to posterior 
brain regions to guide the information flowing through the desired pathways and reach 
the selection of appropriate actions (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
In the laboratory, cognitive control is traditionally tested in interference (or 
“conflict”) tasks such as the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991), which entail conditions that 
require subjects to overcome a stronger habitual response in favor of a weaker (but 
correct) response. Consider, for instance, a variant of the Stroop task employed in the 
empirical section of this dissertation (Figure 1). This task requires a subject to respond to 
the gender of a face image, while ignoring a word label (either “male” or “female”) that 
is overlaid on the image and which can be either congruent (e.g., “male” overlaid on a 
male face) or incongruent (e.g., “female” overlaid on a male face) with the face image 
(Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008). In order to arrive at the correct response during an 
incongruent trial, the subject has to overcome the highly automatic processing of the 
word-meaning in favor of categorizing the face’s gender. Correct response selection on 
incongruent trials therefore requires the application of cognitive control in the PFC, 
strengthening the information flowing through the task-relevant processing pathway to 
win out over the task-irrelevant (though more habitual) one (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Braver & Barch, 2002; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). Accordingly, many 
neuroimaging studies of these types of tasks have documented higher activation in the 
PFC associated with higher conflict and control levels (Barch et al., 2001; M. M. 
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Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2004), and modulated activity in brain regions related to processing task relevant- and 
irrelevant stimuli (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; 
Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004; Wittfoth, Buck, Fahle, & Herrmann, 2006). 
 
Figure 1: Example trials of a gender variant of the Stroop task. 
One crucial question regarding this account, however, is how cognitive control 
itself is controlled. For example, when does cognitive control engage to bias competition 
of pathways? How does it change strength when more or less control is needed? And 
how is control withdrawn? In this dissertation, I argue (as have others before me, see 
Botvinick et al., 2001) that the regulation of cognitive control relies on the prediction of 
processing demands (e.g., anticipated conflict or congruency levels), which is derived 
from previous experience. In the following, two influential non-Bayesian models are 
reviewed: the conflict monitoring model (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001), and the dual 
mechanisms of control model (Braver, 2012). Both models adjust the level of cognitive 
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control based on previous experience. Yet, as described below in detail, none of these 
models can explain how the brain flexibly incorporates and combines information across 
different time scales (short-term and long-term) to predict conflict. As a potential 
solution, this flexibility can be modeled using a Bayesian approach. Then I review basic 
concepts of Bayesian methods and several attempts to model various aspects of 
cognitive control using Bayesian models. 
1.2 Classic Models for Cognitive Control 
1.2.1 The Conflict Monitoring Model 
The conflict monitoring model (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001) treats the 
intervention of cognitive control as a reactive processing adjustment following the 
detection of conflict. This adjustment is achieved by incorporation of two systems: a 
conflict monitoring system that estimates the levels of conflict and sends signals to a 
control system, which in turn delivers biasing signals to information processing 
pathways. It is not entirely clear in the model whether control is originally recruited for 
dealing with conflict in the ongoing trial or for subsequent trials only (for discussion, see 
Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010), but the effects of conflict-driven control that are seen to 
support the model are typically measured by observing performance on the subsequent 
trial(s). 
The specific mechanisms of the conflict monitoring system are made explicit in a 
neural network implementation (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001), in which reaction time 
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(RT) was simulated as the time-point when the Hopfield energy (Hopfield, 1982) of one 
output node (out of two or more) reached a pre-defined threshold. This neural network 
implementation successfully simulated various landmark behavioral effects found in 
interference tasks. For example, the proportion incongruency effect (see Figure 2a), 
which describes the pattern that the larger the proportion of congruent trials is in a 
block, the higher the average interference effect is in that block  (Logan & Zbrodoff, 
1979; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992), and the congruency sequence (or conflict 
adaptation, see Figure 2b) effect - a smaller interference effect (measured by subtracting 
mean RT of congruent trials from mean RT of incongruent or neutral trials) following an 
incongruent trial than after a congruent trial (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), have 
both been simulated successfully by the conflict-monitoring model using a 
reinforcement learning algorithm that updates the prediction of congruency by 
incorporating (in)congruency at the current trial via a fixed learning rate α. Specifically, 
the prediction for the forthcoming trial is a linear combination of the (in)congruency at 
the current trial and the prediction concerning the current trial, with the rates of α  and 
(1 - α), respectively. The model further proposes that the conflict monitoring system is 
housed in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the control system in the lateral PFC. 
These propositions have been supported by neuroimaging findings showing elevated 
activation in the ACC under conditions where conflict is high and control is assumed to 
be low (Barch et al., 2001; M. Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter 
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et al., 1998; Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; MacLeod & 
MacDonald, 2000) and enhanced activation in lateral PFC under conditions where 
conflict is low and control is assumed to be high (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; Kerns et al., 
2004; MacDonald et al., 2000), as well as increased functional connectivity between the 
lateral PFC and regions supporting task-relevant stimulus information in the posterior 
brain (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a).  
 
Figure 2: Data showing proportion incongruency (a) and conflict adaptation (b) 
effects. Pre C/Pre I = Preceded by a congruent/incongruent trial; Current C/Current I = 
current trial is congruent/incongruent. 
 Although the conflict monitoring model is able to simulate the phenomena of 
conflict adaptation and proportion incongruency effects (Botvinick et al (2001), 
simulation 2A and 2B) separately, a closer look at the simulation results suggests the 
model is not able to replicate these two effects using the same set of parameters. 
Specifically, in the simulation of conflict adaptation (simulation 2A), the best model has 
a learning rate of 0.5; while the learning rate is dramatically reduced to 0.05 when 
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simulating the decreasing interference effect as the proportion of incongruent trials 
increases in the simulation of proportion incongruency effects (simulation 2B).  The 0.5 
learning rate in simulating conflict adaptation effects essentially represents a phasic or 
transient mechanism relying more on recent experience, as the last trial weighs as much 
as all previous trials combined; while the 0.05 learning rate reflects a more tonic or 
sustained mechanism incorporating temporally more remote or extended information 
that allows for the proportion of incongruent trials to be learnt. The fact that the conflict-
monitoring model cannot simulate both of these effects simultaneously is problematic, 
given that they are supposed to reflect the same basic phenomenon (conflict-driven 
control) and that conflict adaptation and proportion incongruency effects do in fact co-
occur in a single task-setting (e.g., Torres-Quesada et al., 2013; also see section 3.1), a 
finding which the conflict-monitoring model is clearly unable to capture. 
1.2.2 The Dual Mechanisms of Control Model 
The more recent dual-mechanisms of control model may have the potential to 
overcome this problem, as it specifically accommodates control effects that operate over 
different times scales, by incorporating both a “reactive” and a “proactive” control 
mechanism (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; De Pisapia & Braver, 2006). The 
key difference between these two mechanisms lies in their time scales and their relation 
to stimulus onsets. Specifically, the reactive mechanism accounts for transient changes of 
cognitive control after a stimulus has been encountered (e.g., following conflict), 
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whereas the proactive mechanism monitors long-term changes of conflict density and 
applies changes to cognitive control before the onsets of incoming stimuli. Although 
operating on different time scales, these two mechanisms cooperate to modulate 
cognitive control. To test the feasibility of this model, De Pisapia & Braver (2006) 
conducted a color-naming Stroop fMRI study, which included three types of blocks with 
varying proportions of incongruent trials. The authors found that in ACC and left dlPFC 
the conflict-related (i.e. incongruent – congruent, at trial level) activity was highest when 
most trials were congruent (and proactive control presumably low), suggesting a 
reactive, short-term/phasic type of control being applied; whereas in the right dlPFC, the 
sustained, block-wise activation was the highest when most trials were incongruent, 
suggesting the wielding of a proactive, long-term/tonic type of control. The authors 
furthermore found that a model in which both ACC and the dlPFC units had a reactive 
and a proactive component could simulate both the phasic and tonic activation patterns 
found in the fMRI data. This dual mechanisms of control model represents a novel 
approach to understanding cognitive control, but there is presently little empirical 
evidence to support the idea of two conflict monitoring units working on different time 
scales in the ACC. It is also unclear whether this model can simulate both long-term (e.g. 
proportion incongruency) and short-term (e.g. conflict adaptation) regulation of control 
simultaneously, and it would be more parsimonious if both types of control were 
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integrated into a single mechanism. In the following section, I aim to sketch out how 
such integration can be achieved.  
1.2.3 Cognitive Control as Statistical Inference 
In the computer simulations of both conflict-monitoring and dual-mechanism 
models, short-term information (e.g. congruency at the current trial) and long-term 
information (e.g. congruency at earlier trials) were integrated using a fixed weight. 
Other computational cognitive control models using reinforcement learning (Blais, 
Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007) and Hebbian learning (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 
2009) have also used fixed parameters in their simulations of various behavioral 
phenomena of conflict-control. Although these simulations matched empirical data well, 
the use of a fixed weight for information integration elicits two important, yet 
unanswered questions: (1) how is the weight determined? And (2) (How) does the 
weight change when the (experimental) environment changes? To answer these 
questions, I argue that the weight should be self-adapting based on how reliable the 
short-term and long-term information is. The idea of a self-adapting learning rate is not 
a new concept:  in classical conditioning, there have been models that use the novelty of 
stimuli to affect learning rate (Jiang, Schmajuk, & Egner, 2012; Pearce & Hall, 1980; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Schmajuk, Lam, & Gray, 1996). In these models, novelty 
guides changes in learning rate, which in turn updates the association between 
conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. Since there are no conditioned and 
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unconditioned stimuli in typical interference tasks, these models cannot be directly 
applied to simulating cognitive control processes. However, Bayesian models provide a 
natural solution of dynamically updating predictions based on integrating prior, 
temporally remote (long-term information) with recent observations (short-term 
information). Accordingly, several recent studies have employed Bayesian methods to 
model aspects of cognitive control, which are reviewed in the next section, preceded by 
an overview of Bayesian methods.  
1.3 Overview of Bayesian Methods 
Bayes’ theorem can be written as follows: 
 PY|X = PX|YPYPX  (Eq 1) 
Where X, Yare random variables (e.g. sensory input, internal states, motor output, 
etc). Unlike conventional variables, the value of a random variable can vary due to 
randomness. Thus, a random variable is often represented in the probabilistic 
distribution of its possible values.  This equation means that the conditional probability 
of Y given X could be calculated using the probabilities of X, Y, and the conditional 
probability of X given Y. This equation is especially useful when PY|X (posterior 
probability) is difficult to estimate but PX|Y is relatively easy to obtain. For example, 
when X is an observation and Y is an internal state which cannot be observed directly, 
one can infer the state of Y based on X and PX|Y	using the Bayes’ theorem. Thus, Bayes’ 
theorem can be used to infer, for instance, the distributions of conflict-control, based on 
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the congruency observed. The estimated internal states can then be used to predict 
congruency in forthcoming trials. Bayesian methods have been widely applied in 
cognitive neuroscience studies (e.g., (Bach & Dolan, 2012; Vilares & Kording, 2011)), and 
a comprehensive review of studies using Bayesian methods is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Instead, I focus on Bayesian models that employed a graphical 
representation, because it provides a natural representation of dependence on previous 
information.  
A graphical representation of a Bayesian model (Pearl, 1988) consists of a set of 
nodes and a set of edges connecting pairs of nodes. A node represents a variable in a 
Bayesian model, such as conflict, or observed congruency. In addition, a node is 
associated with the probability distributions of the variable represented. An edge 
represents a relation (reflecting conditional independencies) between two nodes and can 
be either directed or undirected. For example, a directed edge from node A to node B 
means that the value of variable B depends on variable A, but not vice versa. The edge is 
also associated with a distribution on which the estimation of parameters and Bayesian 
inference is based. This distribution encodes interactions between the two variables 
connected. Specifically, a directed edge from node A to node B is associated with a 
conditional probability distribution pB|A, which encodes how variable A influences 
variable B.  
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For example, the temporal dependency of conflict between trials can be formally 
represented using a Bayesian model (Figure 3). In this model f, and o denote predicted 
conflict level and observed congruency at trial i, respectively. f is quantified as the 
probability that the forthcoming trial is incongruent, ranging from 0 to 1. o is a binary 
variable in which 0 and 1 encode a congruent and an incongruent trial, respectively. The 
temporal dependency is represented by edges from the states at the current trial to the 
states at the next trial. An edge from predicted conflict level to observation is added to 
estimate f using Bayesian inference.   
 
Figure 3: A basic Bayesian model of conflict-control. The model entails 2 
variables, conflict () and observation (, shown in grey indicating this variable is 
observable) for each trial. The directed edges indicate the information flow. 
This Bayesian model does not only allow dependency between variables to be 
incorporated, but also significantly reduces the amount of computation needed to infer 
the states of these variables. Based on the structure of the graphical representation and 
the Markov property which states that each variable’s future value is conditionally 
independent of the past, given its present value, the joint distribution in this model of 
cognitive control can be factorized as: 
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pf, o|o 	… , o = pfpf|fpo|f df (Eq 2) 
  The conditional probability distribution on the left side contains many 
variables. Without any prior knowledge of the model structure, it is intractable to 
calculate, or even store this distribution. However, the Markov condition decomposes 
this distribution into a product of three much simpler distributions, each of which is 
easy to store and compute. Specifically, the Markov condition shows that the prediction 
(states at trial i + 1) based on all previous information is equivalent to the prediction 
based only on the previous trial. In other words, relevant historical information is 
integrated into the states of the most recent trial. Thus, storage and computation 
involving older trials are not necessary.  
In sum, the graphical representation incorporates dependency between model 
variables; and its structure greatly reduces the computational and storage burden of 
estimating posterior probabilities.  
1.4 Bayesian Models for Cognitive Control 
Recently, Bayesian models with graphical representation have demonstrated 
great potential in modeling cognitive functions using behavioral data (Mozer, 
Colagrosso, & Huber, 2002; Reynolds & Mozer, 2009; Shenoy, Rao, & Yu, 2010; Shenoy & 
Yu, 2011; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Tenenbaum & Xu, 2000; Vossel et al., 
2013; Yu, Dayan, & Cohen, 2009) and brain imaging data (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & 
Rushworth, 2007; den Ouden, Daunizeau, Roiser, Friston, & Stephan, 2010; Ide, Shenoy, 
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Yu, & Li, 2013). In the following, I review recent studies using Bayesian models with 
graphical representation to model various aspects of cognitive control, including speed-
accuracy trade-off (section 1.4.1), conflict effects in the Eriksen flanker task (section 
1.4.2), and response inhibition (section 1.4.3). The Bayesian models reviewed below all 
attempted to account for decisions/behavior using within-trial and/or inter-trial 
simulations. In the within-trial simulations, those models accumulated evidence from 
independent sources via Bayesian integration. The decision/behavior best supported by 
the evidence was then selected by the models. In the between-trial simulations, 
predictions of stimuli were based on trial-history information integrated via Bayes’ rule. 
The predictions were then used as the initial evidence for within-trial simulations. 
1.4.1 Bayesian Modeling of Speed-accuracy Trade-off 
Some recent studies demonstrate the feasibility of using generative Bayesian 
models to simulate both within-trial dynamics and across-trial sequential effects in 
cognitive control. One such study applied a Bayesian model to explaining the dynamics 
of the speed-accuracy tradeoff and its dependency on trial-history from two speeded 
discrimination tasks (Mozer et al., 2002). Subjects responded to a target letter by pressing 
one button and responded to other letters by either pressing a second button 
(discrimination task) or doing nothing (go/no-go task). The Bayesian model used in this 
study operates at both within- and across-trial levels. At the within-trial level, the 
posterior distribution at a given time point encoded the probability of making one 
 17 
response vs. the other. This posterior distribution of responses depended on the prior 
distribution of responses and the sensory input. At the beginning of each trial, the 
posterior distribution is the same as the prior distribution. This posterior distribution of 
responses is then subject to (Bayesian) updating after each time point to favor the 
response suggested by visual input. Because this updating was performed at every time 
point, the influence of visual input accumulated with time, guiding the posterior 
distribution of response to gradually shift from the prior distribution to a distribution 
which is biased toward the correct response to the visual stimulus. Therefore, the effect 
of cognitive control is reflected by the change of the posterior distribution based on 
accumulation of sensory input. The simulated RT was the time that optimized the cost of 
sensory input accumulation against the probability of an incorrect response. The 
simulated accuracy was estimated from the posterior distribution at the simulated RT. 
For both the discrimination task and the go/no-go task, within-trial simulation 
successfully replicated accuracy and RT patterns from empirical data under different 
target to non-target ratios. Based on these simulations, the authors argued that speed-
accuracy trade-off is optimal in these tasks in that it minimizes a cost that combines time 
pressure and the certainty of perception. At the across-trial level, the initial prior was 
also updated after each trial using a similar rule as used in within-trial simulation to 
account for sequential effects of response priming. The across-trial simulation 
successfully captured complex RT and accuracy patterns when trials were grouped 
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based on the trial history, up to 4 trials preceding the current trial. In this study, then, a 
Bayesian model was used to simulate perceptual decision-making as an integration of 
prior information and visual input, which could naturally be modeled using the prior 
distribution and the likelihood distribution, respectively.  
1.4.2 Bayesian Modeling of the Eriksen Flanker Task 
To investigate different mechanisms that may account for generating conflict in 
the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974, also see Figure 4), a study by Yu and 
colleagues (Yu et al., 2009) applied two rival Bayesian models to behavioral data from a 
“deadline version” of the flanker task (Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 
1988; Servan-Schreiber, Bruno, Carter, & Cohen, 1998). Here, subjects were pressured to 
make fast responses (in order to beat an experimenter-imposed deadline) to a target 
(center) letter (either “S” or “H”) that is flanked by distractors (either “S” or “H”). Thus a 
trial could be either congruent (e.g. “SSSSS” or “HHHHH”) or incongruent (e.g. 
“HHSHH” or “SSHSS”, see). Bayesian models were used to simulate two different 
potential sources of conflict, namely “compatibility bias” (a prior assuming that more 
than half of the trials were congruent) and “spatial uncertainty” (where perception of 
one letter was interfered with by nearby letters). Both models adopted the same 
hierarchical design with 3 levels: The highest level encoded the (in)congruency of a trial; 
below the congruency level was the stimulus level, in which there were 3 nodes, each 
representing a letter; at the bottom was a level of 3 nodes, each encoding activity of a 
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group of neurons whose receptive fields were centered on a particular letter. The 
difference between the two models lay in how prior knowledge was applied: in the 
compatibility bias model, the prior assumed there were more congruent trials than 
incongruent trials, and each node at the level of neuronal activity was only influenced 
by the letter it represented and random noise. This model simulated a situation in which 
the conflict monitoring process was biased to an expectation of low conflict and 
receptive fields of neuron groups were narrow. By contrast, the prior of the spatial 
uncertainty model assumed a 50/50 distribution of congruent and incongruent trials, but 
here a neuron’s activity was influenced by not only the letter its receptive field centered 
on, but also the neighboring letter(s). This model simulated a situation in which neurons 
have large receptive fields and the interference is caused by the ambiguous neuronal 
signals containing information of different letters.  
 
Figure 4: Example stimuli of an Eriksen fanker task. 
Within-trial and between-trial simulations were then conducted using both 
models. To simulate within-trial dynamics, the simulation was divided into multiple 
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time steps. The two models operated as neural decoders: they estimated visual input 
and congruency based on simulated neuronal activity. Thus, the key part of the 
simulation is the joint posterior distribution of letter and congruency conditioned on 
neuronal activity, which started with the prior distribution of congruency and visual 
input, and was then updated at every time step based on Bayes’ rule. A simulated 
response was made when the marginal posterior distribution of one letter exceeded a 
pre-defined threshold. Both models successfully replicated RT distributions acquired 
from empirical studies using deadline Eriksen flanker tasks. The two models were also 
extended to allow for across-trial updates of the prior distribution of congruency. The 
extended models were able to simulate conflict adaptation and proportion incongruency 
effects in Eriksen flanker tasks (Yu et al., 2009). 
In another study, a Bayesian spotlight diffusion model was proposed to account 
for various aspects of the Eriksen flanker task (White, Brown, & Ratcliff, 2012). 
Specifically, a spotlight diffusion model (White, Ratcliff, & Starns, 2011) was used to 
simulate attentional mechanisms, and Bayesian belief-updating was employed to 
account for the information processing mechanisms involved in task performance (i.e., 
how evidence for response selection was accumulated within a trial). A spotlight was 
used to simulate the locus of attention, within which all information was selected as 
evidence for the decision-making process. At the beginning of a trial, the spotlight 
covered both the center target and the flankers, such that the overall evidence was 
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driven predominantly by the flanker stimuli. The spotlight then gradually narrowed to 
only cover the central letter, resulting in the evidence being biased toward the target 
information. At each time point, beliefs were updated to incorporate new evidence 
about what the correct response was, using Bayesian evidence integration. Accordingly, 
the model predicts that responses are biased to the flankers at the beginning of a trial 
and then gradually shift to be dominated by target information. By fitting the model to 
empirical data, it was shown that this Bayesian spotlight diffusion approach could 
successfully account for the relationship between RT and accuracy in the Eriksen flanker 
task (White et al, 2012).  
1.4.3 Bayesian Modeling of Response Inhibition 
Bayesian models have also been employed in investigating inhibitory control 
(Ide et al., 2013; Shenoy et al., 2010; Shenoy & Yu, 2011). In these studies, subjects 
performed a stop-signal task, in which a habitual response based on a (frequent) go 
signal needed to be suppressed when a (rare) stop signal was presented at varying 
intervals after the go signal. Bayesian models were used to provide a rational account 
(i.e. behavior guided by optimizing a cost function) for various behavioral patterns 
observed in the stop-signal task. Here, one Bayesian model was used to simulate beliefs 
about the appropriate action to take, and a second Bayesian model was used to simulate 
beliefs about perceiving a stop signal. Within each trial, both beliefs started with the 
(true) prior probability of go/stop trials in the task, and were then updated based on 
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visual input using Bayes’ rule at every time step.  For each time step, a cost function was 
calculated based on the beliefs and possible actions available. An action (i.e., button-
press vs. withholding response) was selected by minimizing the cost function. This 
within-trial Bayesian model successfully simulated the pattern of increased error rates as 
the interval between the onset of the go signal and the onset of the stop-signal increased. 
It could also simulate the commonly observed faster responses in error stop trials 
compared to successful go trials (Shenoy et al., 2010; Shenoy & Yu, 2011). A third 
Bayesian model was employed for simulating between-trial effects, predicting the 
likelihood of encountering a stop-signal in the forthcoming trial. This prediction was a 
linear combination of the prior probability of encountering a stop-trial and the posterior 
probability of encountering a stop-trial based on trial history. These two probabilities 
were integrated via fixed weights. The prediction significantly correlated with RTs, 
where high probability of encountering a stop signal predicts slower responses, 
suggesting more inhibitory control being exerted (Ide et al., 2013). Additionally, this 
model successfully simulated post-stop-trial response slowing, and increased RTs and 
error rates when the proportion of stop-trials increased (Shenoy et al., 2010; Shenoy & 
Yu, 2011). Based on these Bayesian predictions, fMRI data recorded during the stop-
signal task (Ide et al., 2013) further revealed that the dorsal ACC encodes prediction 
error (presence/absence of stop signal - prediction).  
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1.5 Towards Modeling the Flexibility of Cognitive Control 
Although the models reviewed above were successful in simulating various 
effects of cognitive control, the fixed parameters used in these simulations raise several 
concerns. First, it is unclear whether the way in which these parameters were 
determined in the models reflects the mechanisms of parameter-selection in the brain. 
This is especially unlikely (or impossible) in cases where optimal parameters were fit 
from data: here, a model determines the parameters after acquiring all data, in contrast 
to the brain having to determine the parameters on the fly. Second, even with a model 
that could potentially provide on-the-fly simulation (e.g. the model in Figure 3), the lack 
of a mechanism for online adjustment of cognitive control would result in sub-optimal 
performance in a non-stationary environment, because without such a mechanism, the 
parameters that determine the level of cognitive control (e.g. the learning rate) have to 
stay constant throughout the experiment. Given the high flexibility required of cognitive 
control, it is unclear that those fixed parameters are globally optimal across various 
experimental configurations. In fact, it has been shown that fixed learning rates are 
suboptimal in non-stationary environments (Behrens et al., 2007; den Ouden et al., 2010; 
Vessel et al., 2013). In the next chapter, I therefore propose a Bayesian model that 
resolves these two concerns. This model simulates the on-the-fly selection of parameters 
in the brain by making estimates only based on previous trial information. It also models 
the flexibility of cognitive control by incorporating a component that accounts for 
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changes in the experimental environment. This Bayesian model has the potential of 
tackling the research question of how a parsimonious, unified mechanism can flexibly 
adjust cognitive control to adapt to various environments. By applying this model to 
empirical data, I demonstrate that it can simulate various key phenomena of cognitive 
control in a Stroop task in Chapter 3. Facilitated by this Bayesian model, I show that 
neural substrates supporting this flexible mechanism and their connections can be 
explored using brain imaging techniques (Chapter 4). 
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2. A Bayesian Model of Cognitive Control 
In this chapter, I propose a Bayesian model that can account for the flexibility of 
cognitive control over conflict in a non-stationary environment. The modeling done 
relies on the ability to perform statistical inference, taking the perspective that the 
regulation of cognitive control should be considered as a process of predicting the 
optimal amount of cognitive control required in a given context. To achieve this 
contextual flexibility, the model estimates future conflict from previous experience and, 
importantly, it does so via a weighed integration of longer-term and short-term 
estimations of conflict distributions, with the integration weights being adjusted on the 
basis of the (belief about) volatility of the environment. For instance, in a stable 
environment (e.g. when most trials are congruent / incongruent), the weights are biased 
to historically remote/long-term information because an occasional oddball trial (e.g., an 
incongruent stimulus in a largely congruent trial history context) is unlikely to reflect a 
true change in the environmental statistics. When the environment is fast-changing (e.g. 
when the proportion of congruent trials varies frequently over time), however, the 
weights are biased to more recent information. This is because older information is likely 
to be outdated, and an unexpected trial type may indicate a true change of conflict 
likelihood in the environment.  In order to assess the stability of the environment, I 
extend the model in Figure 3 by adding a volatility variable (denoted by v), the belief of 
which in turn determines the weights of integration (Figure 5). The structure of this 
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model is identical to the model of Behrens et al., (2007). The mathematical formulation of 
the model is described in details in section 2.1. This model is also an example of a 
hierarchical model, in which the information flows in one direction, that is, there are no 
reciprocal edges from nodes at lower levels to nodes at higher levels.  Hierarchical 
Bayesian models have been widely used in modeling cognitive functions such as 
categorization (Tenenbaum & Xu, 2000; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007) and visual cognition 
(Lee & Mumford, 2003; Summerfield, Behrens, & Koechlin, 2011). This model yields a 
probability distribution over the predicted conflict level variable. In the implementation 
of this model, predicted conflict level is approximated using the probability of 
encountering an incongruent trial. In other words, the predicted conflict level is higher if 
the next trial is deemed more likely to be incongruent. Both variables are then used to 
determine the amount of control needed, which is reflected in sequential effects such as 
conflict adaptation and longer-term effects like proportion incongruency. Another way 
to understand the relation between volatility and predicted conflict level can be drawn 
from Yu and Dayan (2005): predicted conflict level encodes the probability (distribution) 
that the forthcoming trial is incongruent. The variance of this distribution (i.e. change of 
probability) is determined by the volatility.  This chapter is organized as follows: section 
2.1 describes this model and its implementation in details. Sectoion 2.2 presents proof-
of-principle validations of the proposed model. 
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Figure 5: The graphical representation of the Bayesian model of flexible 
conflict-control. The model uses 3 variables, volatility (), conflict (), and observation 
(, shown in grey indicating this variable is observable) for each trial. The directed 
edges indicate the information flow. 
2.1The structure of the Bayesian Model 
The graphical representation of the proposed Bayesian model is shown in Figure 
5. Each row represents a variable, namely volatility (v), conflict (f), and observation (o). 
Each column represents the state of the variables in a trial. The generative model (how 
the distribution of each variable is determined by other variable(s) and / or parameter(s)) 
is shown as follows (see below for definition of distribution parameters): 
v~Nv, σ" 
f~Betaf&2()*+ , 2f& + 1,,f&2()*+ , 2f& + 2()*+ , 1 
o~BernoulliEf 
(Eq 3) 
This Bayesian model simulates a trial sequence of an experiment on a trial-by-
trial basis. Within each trial, the simulation takes the form of a predict-update algorithm 
that is used in Kalman filters (Johan Masreliez & Martin, 1977). In other words, the 
simulation of each trial i + 1 contains two steps. The first step makes prediction of the 
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states of v and f before the stimulus is presented. These predictions are used to 
account for the behavioral patterns observed in the empirical studies reported in chapter 
3 (see below) and brain activity presented in chapter 4 (see below). The second step 
updates / filters the belief of the states of v and f given the observed congruency 
o. These two steps are repeated for each trial to generate trial-by-trial estimates. 
       In the first step, the model initially predicts a joint distribution based on the 
model’s previous states and 2 transition distributions: 
pσ", v, f|o, … , o
= 2pv|v, σ" pf|f, vpσ", v, f|o, … , odvdf 
 
(Eq 4) 
       Where σ"constrains how fast v can change over time. Specifically, 
pv|v, σ"~Nv, σ". In other words, the transition distribution pv|v, σ" is 
Gaussian distribution with the mean of v and the standard deviation (SD) of σ". This 
transition distribution assumes that v is most likely to remain in its previous states, 
although it can also possibly drift to another state. σ" determines how likely it is for v to 
shift to a new state. Because in the experiments below the volatility altered between 
conditions and trials, σ" is set as a variable and used the Bayesian model to infer its 
state. Different from other variables, σ" is considered as unchanged throughout an 
experiment. Thus, as can be seen below, it does not have a subscript indicating its 
temporal state or a transition distribution that governs its temporal shift. The update of 
 29 
its estimate at each trial reflects the model ‘s change of its belief of σ", rather than the 
change of the true underlying σ" per se. The transition distribution pv|v, σ" 
determines how the estimate of v is used to predict its future state, which is in turn 
employed to compute the predicted conflict level, as described below.  
       pf|f, v describes how f can change over time. 
pf|f, v~Betaα, β. This distribution is a beta distribution, with its parameters α 
and β in the following form: 
 5 f = α , 1α + β , 2v = log7α + β (Eq 5) 
       There are two main reasons for using a beta distribution: first, the predicted 
conflict level was defined as the probability of encountering an incongruent stimulus in 
the upcoming trial, so the possible value of f should be limited to a range of 0 to 1, 
which is also the range of values that a beta distribution is defined on. Second and more 
important, with the current set-up, the probability density function of pf|f, v 
takes the following form: 
 pf|f, v = constant ∙ f;< ∙ 1 , f=< (Eq 6) 
       Which can be interpreted as the likelihood function of observing α , 1 
incongruent trials and β , 1 congruent trials with the underlying proportion 
incongruency f. Thus, a larger pf|f, v suggests the prediction of conflict is better 
supported by temporally more-extended trial-history information. Following this 
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interpretation, according to the equations 5 and 6, v controls the length of the trial 
sequences of this likelihood function. A larger v suggests a longer trial sequence to 
take into account, which in turn indicates more dependence on long-term information, 
or a more stable condition. In other words, a larger v leads to a narrower spread of 
pf|f, v, which constrains f from drifting far from its previous state. Another 
interpretation of pf|f, v can be linked to the learning rate used in many 
reinforcement learning models: a narrower spread of pf|f, v results in smaller 
difference between f and f< that resembles the effect of a smaller learning rate, 
compared to a wider spread of pf|f, v determined by a smaller v. However, it 
is counterintuitive to have a larger volatility value when the environment is more stable. 
Thus when reporting volatility, a linear transform was used to make more volatile task 
settings correspond to larger volatility estimates while preserving the quantitative 
patterns of the results (see below). Furthermore, f is the mode of pf|f, v, 
indicating that the predicted conflict level is most likely to reflect its previous state. 
Thus, ∬pv|v, σ" pf|f, vdvdf can be viewed as how the prediction is made 
by incorporating various learning rates. The third term in the integral, 
pσ", v, f|o, … , o< is the belief in the previous trial and also represents the weights 
pσ", v, f|o, … , o in making the prediction (Eq. 3). After the joint distribution 
pσ", v, f|o, … , o is calculated, the estimates of volatility and conflict are 
computed as the mean of their corresponding marginalized distributions. The observed 
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congruency o is then predicted to have a Bernoulli distribution with a probability of 
Ef of incongruency, where Ef denotes the mathematical expectation of f. 
In the first step, I adopted a numeric implementation for this Bayesian model to 
avoid the complexity of developing an analytical implementation: the range of each of 
the variables of σ", v and f was divided into multiple segments with equal length. For 
example, f was represented using an array ranging from 0 to 1 and with a step size of 
0.02 (that is, 51 cells). The value of each cell represented the probabilistic density at that 
point. Similarly, the joint probabilistic distribution was represented by a 3D array with 3 
dimensions of σ", v and f. pf|f, v was represented using a 3D array with 3 
dimensions of f, f and v. And pv|v, σ" was represented using a 3D array with 
3 dimensions of v, v and σ". All the aforementioned calculations were performed on 
these arrays. Specifically, step 1 took the form of: 
pσ", v, f|o, … , o
= ??pv|v, σ"@A"A pf|f, vpσ", v, f|o, … , o 
(Eq 7) 
After the first step, pσ", v, f|o, … , o was divided by its sum across σ", v 
and fso that the cells in pσ", v, f|o, … , o summed to 1. The marginalization was 
done by collapsing the other dimensions. The mean was approximated using a weighed 
sum, ∑xpx. 
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       In the second step (i.e. after the congruency of trial i + 1 is observed), the 
belief of variables is updated using the observed congruency in the following manner: 
 pσ", v, f|o, … , o
= pσ", v, f|o, … , opf|o (Eq 8) 
       Where 
 pf|o = D1 , f, if	o	is	incongruent	f, if	o	is	congruent  (Eq 9) 
       is the prediction error between the predicted conflict level and the true 
congruency.  
In theory, the initial pσ", v, f (the dependence is removed to reflect that no 
knowledge from the trial sequence has been applied yet) can take any form to reflect the 
prior knowledge of the trial sequence. In the implementation of this model, the initial 
pσ", v, f was set to a uniform distribution, indicating unbiased belief of the 
statistical characteristics of the task. As the experiment proceeded (i.e., more trials were 
processed), this initial distribution was updated to a distribution that with more 
information of the trial sequence. Note that similar to many models, this initial 
distribution requires sampling from the trial sequence for proper update. Thus a “burn-
in” block is usually added to a trial sequence for this Bayesian model to update its belief 
to adapt to the trial sequence. And the trials in this burn-in period are sometimes 
excluded from analysis. This is because that there is no guarantee that the subjects and 
the Bayesian model share the same prior knowledge. However, after the burn-in period,   
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it is safe to assume that both the subjects and the model have refreshed their belief to 
better approximate the task. Hence the model can then be used to account for behaviors 
and brain activity. 
As mentioned before, the definition of v would result in a counterintuitive 
representation of having a lower v in a more volatile setting. Thus, to avoid confusion, I 
transformed the condition-specific volatility estimates before presenting them: 
 vEF = maxv + minv , vH (Eq 10) 
Where maxv and minv are the maximum and minimum group-level mean of 
volatility estimates across all conditions, respectively. After this transform, more volatile 
conditions have higher vEFs. Note that because all vHs were transformed using the same 
constants, this transform had no bias on the results of analyses reported below. 
2.2 Proof-of-principle Validations 
To test whether this Bayesian model is able to learn from a trial sequence and, 
more importantly, whether it is able to detect changes of volatility in an experimental 
manipulation, I conducted 3 validation studies. In section 2.2.1, I qualitatively describe 
the behavior of this model in learning a single trial sequence. In section 2.2.2, I 
demonstrate that the model is able to detect changes in volatility due to varying 
underlying proportions of (in)congruency. In section 2.2.3, I propose a task design that 
induces trial blocks with varying volatility. Using this design, I show that the Bayesian 
model successfully detects different volatility levels due to various frequencies of 
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changes in proportion (in)congruency. The performance of this model and 
reinforcement learning models with various fixed learning rates are also compared 
using trial sequences generated under this task design.  
2.2.1Time Courses of Model Variables in Simulating a Trial Sequence 
In order to inspect this Bayesian model’s performance, a sequence of 100 
randomly generated trials (proportion incongruency = 0.8) was fed to the model. The 
time courses of trial-by-trial estimates of predicted conflict level and volatility derived 
from the model are depicted in Figure 6. The first 10 trials were used as burn-in period 
and were thus discarded. As can be seen in Figure 6a, the predicted conflict level in 
general approaches the underlying proportion incongruency, suggesting that the model 
estimates incorporate long-term information. In addition, after a (rare) congruent trial, 
the predicted conflict level is reduced in the subsequent trial, indicating that the 
estimates also incorporate short-term information. The time course of volatility (Figure 
6b) displays an expected pattern: volatility drops in the absence of rare congruent trials, 
suggesting a stable environment. After encountering a congruent trial, the model raises 
its estimate of volatility.  
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Figure 6: Time courses of predicted conflict level (a, blue line) and volatility (b, 
green line) in learning a randomly generated trial sequence that has a proportion 
incongruency of 0.8.  The trial sequence is plotted in red line. Spikes in the red line  
indicate onsets of congruent trials. 
In the Bayesian model, the purpose of the volatility variable is to provide a 
learning-rate modulator: higher volatility should result in a larger learning rate. To test 
this hypothesis, I estimated the trial-by-trial learning rate based on the classic 
reinforcement learning algorithm. Specifically, according to the temporal difference 
(TD(0)) reinforcement learning algorithm (Sutton, 1988), the update of predicted conflict 
level can be expressed as follows: 
f = 1 , αf + αo (Eq 11) 
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Thus, given the estimates of predicted conflict level fand f, and the 
congruency o, the learning rate α can be estimated as: 
α = f , fo , f  (Eq 12) 
The estimated learning rate exhibits a highly significant positive correlation with 
volatility (Figure 7, I = 0.55, P < 0.0001), indicating that volatility does in fact regulate the 
updating of predicted conflict level. Specifically, because o represents short-term (most-
recent and only contains a single trial) information, the α indeed represents the 
dependence on short-term information in predicting future conflict level. Accordingly, 
the positive correlation between learning rate and volatility suggests that the Bayesian 
model augments its reliance on short-term information in predicting conflict level when 
the environment becomes more volatile. 
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Figure 7: Estimated learning rate, plotted as a function of volatility. The trend 
line shows a significant positive correlation between these 2 estimates at the trial 
level. 
2.2.2 Modeling Proportion Incongruency Induced Volatility 
A crucial validation for this Bayesian model is to test its sensitivity to the 
differences in volatility between various experimental settings. To this end, I first tested 
whether the model could distinguish volatility caused by proportion incongruency. 
Recall that one way of understanding volatility is to treat is as the certainty of prediction 
(Yu & Dayan, 2005). From this perspective, a trial sequence with more extreme 
proportion incongruency (e.g., 0.9 or 0.1) should be less volatile compared to a trial 
sequence with a proportion incongruency of 0.5, because in the former the prediction of 
the incongruency is more certain (i.e., the SD of congruency is smaller). Similarly, the 
proportion incongruency of 0.9 and 0.1 should have similar volatility. If the Bayesian 
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model operates as expected, its estimates of volatility should reflect these varying levels 
of volatility across the proportion incongruency conditions. 
For each of three proportion incongruency conditions (0.1, 0.5 and 0.9), fifty trial 
sequences were randomly generated, each containing 100 trials. The trial sequences were 
then processed by the Bayesian model. The resulting estimates of predicted conflict level 
and volatility after the burn-in period (the first 10 trials) were averaged. The condition 
mean predicted conflict level and volatility were then compared across conditions using 
1-way ANOVA and post-hoc 2-sample t-tests. 
As a sanity check, the Bayesian model successfully distinguished the condition-
mean predicted conflict level between the 3 conditions (Figure 1Figure 8a; ANOVA: 
J7,KL= 62416.24, P < 0.0001; Post-hoc t-tests:  proportion incongruency of 0.9 > proportion 
incongruency of 0.5, MNO = 182.23, P < 0.0001; proportion incongruency of 0.5 > proportion 
incongruency of 0.1, MNO = 171.39, P < 0.0001; proportion incongruency of 0.9 > proportion 
incongruency of 0.1, MNO = 353.39, P < 0.0001). The comparison of volatility also matches 
the predictions: a significant main effect was found in the ANOVA (Figure 8b; ANOVA: 
J7,KL= 8.22, P < 0.001). Post-hoc t-tests showed that the volatility in the condition with 
0.5 proportion incongruency was significantly higher than those in the conditions with 
0.9 (MNO = 3.63, P < 0.001) and 0.1 (MNO = 3.62, P < 0.001) proportion incongruency. No 
significant difference of volatility was found between the conditions with 0.9 and 0.1 
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proportion incongruency (MNO = 0.40, P > 0.69). Thus, as expected, the Bayesian model 
successfully distinguishes volatility between different experimental settings.   
 
Figure 8: Group mean predicted conflict level (a) and volatility (b) and their 
mean standard error (MSE), plotted as a function of the underlying proportion 
incongruency. Note that in (a) the error bars are too short to become visible.      
2.2.3 Modeling Volatility Induced by the Frequency of Alternating 
Proportion Incongruency 
Another strategy of creating experimental conditions with various volatility is to 
manipulate the frequency of alternating two levels of pre-selected proportion 
incongruency (Behrens et al., 2007). A higher frequency of alternation leads to a faster-
changing environment and in turn makes for condition with higher volatility. Thus, 
distinguishing volatility induced by different frequencies of alternating underlying 
proportions of incongruency can serve as another test for the Bayesian model. 
Following this rationale, two experimental conditions (the “stable” condition and 
the “volatile” condition) were designed. In each condition, a hundred trial sequences 
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were randomly generated. A trial sequence consisted of 100 trials, the first 20 of which 
had a proportion incongruency of 0.5 and served as the burn-in block. The proportion 
incongruency in remaining 80 trials stayed at 0.8 in the stable condition and alternated 
between 0.2 and 0.8 every 20 trials (0.05 Hz) in the volatile condition. The trial sequences 
were then learned by the Bayesian model. The trials in the burn-in block were removed 
from further analysis. The condition-specific time course of predicted conflict level was 
averaged across trial sequences and visualized for sanity check. The sequence mean 
volatility was compared between the 2 conditions to test if the model can successfully 
detect changes of volatility. 
 
Figure 9: Simulation results. (a) Group mean time courses of proportion 
incongruency and predicted conflict level of actual trial sequences and model 
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predictions, respectively. (b) Group mean volatility and MSE, plotted as a function of 
run conditions.  
As depicted in Figure 9a, in both conditions, the predicted conflict level tracks 
(the change of) the underlying proportion incongruency, suggesting that the model 
correctly updated its belief about the task sequences. In particular, in the volatile 
condition, the predicted conflict level adjusted swiftly to reflect the most-recent 
proportion incongruency. More importantly, the volatility estimates in the volatile 
condition were significantly higher than in the stable condition (MNO = 17.84, P < 0.0001). 
This result strongly supports that the claims the Bayesian model is able to detect 
differences in volatility caused by varying frequencies of alternating underlying 
proportions of incongruency. 
I argued above that a fundamental limitation of reinforcement learning models 
with fixed learning rates is that they are unable to achieve optimal performance across 
experimental settings with various volatility settings. To validate this hypothesis, 
ninety-nine reinforcement learners with (fixed) learning rates from 0.01 to 0.99 (step size 
= 0.01) were trained using the trial sequences described above. To quantify performance, 
the square of prediction error (SPE, defined as the difference between the predicted 
conflict level and observed congruency) was computed for each of the reinforcement 
learners and the Bayesian model for each trial sequence. Two-sample t-tests of SPE 
between the Bayesian model and each of the reinforcement learners were conducted 
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within each condition, as well as across the 2 conditions (trial sequences from the 2 
conditions were randomly paired). 
The results are depicted in Figure 10. Two patterns are revealed here. First, as 
expected, the learning rate achieving optimal performance in stable runs (learning rate = 
0.08, SPE = 14.05) is lower than the optimal learning rate for volatile runs (learning rate = 
0.25, SPE = 17.86), because stable runs require less contribution from the most-recent 
information in making predictions. These results replicated the ones found in Botvinick 
et al (2001), where a larger learning rate was selected to best account for the conflict 
adaptation effect than the proportion incongruency effect. It is also not surprising to find 
that the optimal learning rate for both conditions combined falls between these two 
values (learning rate = 0.18, SPE = 32.55) .  
Second, in the comparison involving only the volatile runs, the Bayesian model 
(SPE = 17.56) outperformed all 99 reinforcement learners (Figure 10b, P < 0.0001 for all 
paired t-tests). This is attributed to the fact that the Bayesian model adaptively changes 
its dependence on short-term information (e.g., larger dependence when the proportion 
incongruency alternated, versus lower dependence when the model learned the new 
proportion incongruency). Although the Bayesian model was not the best model in 
stable runs, its performance was still better than 78 out of the 99 reinforcement learners 
(Figure 10c, SPE = 14.88, P < 0.05 for each of the 78 paired t-tests). Crucially, when both 
conditions were combined together to form an environment that requires flexibility in 
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the adjustment of cognitive control, the Bayesian model performed significantly better 
than all 99 reinforcement learners (Figure 10a, SPE = 32.45, P < 0.05 for all paired t-tests). 
When viewing the choice of an optimal learner from all reinforcement learners as a 
model selection process, one can see that even with the unrealistic advantage of selecting 
the best-performing fixed learning rate in a post-hoc manner, the reinforcement learning 
algorithm still fails to outperform the Bayesian model, which predicted forthcoming 
congruency on-the-fly. Moreover, the reinforcement learning algorithm selected 3 
distinct learning rates to best account for 3 experimental settings, while the Bayesian 
model worked in exactly the same way for all settings. Taken together, in this section it 
has been demonstrated that the Bayesian model does not only detect the difference in 
volatility changes between different experimental environments, the detected changes 
also successfully inform the model’s prediction of forthcoming congruency. 
The results also support the notion that the proposed experimental design is 
effective in constructing experimental environments to test the flexible adjustment of 
cognitive control. Compared to the manipulation using proportion incongruency in 
section 2.2.2, this approach is more effective (i.e., more statistically significant in the 
comparison of volatility between conditions). Thus, in the next chapters, this design is 
used as the main approach for manipulating volatility. 
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Figure 10: Comparison of the SPE in predicting forthcoming congruency 
between the Bayesian model and reinforced learning models with various learning 
rates. (a), (b) and (c) depict comparison results based on all runs, only volatile runs 
and only stable runs, respectively. The SPE of the Bayesian model (red) is plotted as a 
baseline to facilitate visual inspection of the results.  
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3. The Computational Mechanisms of Cognitive Control 
The aforementioned proof-of-principle validations have demonstrated that the 
Bayesian model is sensitive to changes in volatility. In this chapter, I describe 3 
behavioral studies that further test whether this model can account for behavioral 
patterns observed from tasks involving flexible cognitive control.  
3.1 Simulating the Short-term and Long-term Trial History 
Effects of Cognitive Control 
In this section, I first confirm that short-term and long-term trial history effects 
occur simultaneously in a single empirical dataset (e.g., Torres-Quesada et al., 2013). 
Then I demonstrate that both effects can be simulated simultaneously using the Bayesian 
model. Importantly, no post-hoc optimization of parameters was necessary in the 
simulation. 
3.1.1 Subjects 
 Fifty-six healthy volunteers (mean age = 26.1, 30 females) gave informed consent 
in accordance with institutional guidelines. All subjects were native or highly proficient 
English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
Stimulus delivery and behavioral data collection were carried out using 
Presentation software (http://www.neurobs.com/). Stimuli were presented on a 19 inch 
LCD screen with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Stimuli consisted of a collection of 24 black and 
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white photographs of male and female faces (12 each) of neutral expression that were 
overlaid with red gender word labels (“male” and “female”), which could be printed in 
lower or upper case lettering. On each trial, one face-word compound stimulus 
(subtending approximately 3° of horizontal and 4° of vertical visual angle) was 
presented against a gray background in the center of the screen. Stimuli were presented 
for 500 ms, followed by a jittered inter-stimulus interval (ISI) ranging from 2 to 3 s in 
uniformly distributed steps of 500 ms, during which a fixation cross remained on screen. 
Subjects performed a speeded button response that categorized the gender of the face 
stimulus with either index finger (for example, left-hand response to male faces, right-
hand response to female faces, counterbalanced across subjects), while trying to ignore 
the task-irrelevant gender labels and stimulus locations. Face stimuli never repeated 
across adjacent trials, and the lettering alternated between lower- and upper-case across 
trial. A practice run was conducted before the main task to ensure subjects 
comprehended the task requirements. 
3.1.3 Experimental Design 
 This task consisted of 7 runs of 4 blocks each. Each block contained 41 trials with 
pseudo-randomized congruency. Across all blocks, the proportion of congruent trials 
followed the order of approximately (deviated by 1 trial, or ~2.4%) 15%, 35%, 65%, 85%, 
75%, 50% and 25%, repeated for 4 times over the 7 runs. Within each block, the 
proportion incongruency remained constant. The starting proportion incongruency and 
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the order of the sequence were counter-balanced across subjects. To model both the 
conflict adaptation and proportion incongruency effects, RT data was analyzed using a 7 
(proportion incongruency) × 2 (previous congruency) × 2 (current congruency) factorial 
design.  
3.1.4 Data Analysis 
For the behavioral data, the mean RT was computed in each subject for each of 
the experimental cells, excluding incorrect and post-error trials, as well as RT values that 
deviated >2 SDs from an individual subject’s grand mean. The trimmed RT values were 
then averaged across subjects and entered into repeated measures 3-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) with the factors described above. For the simulation data, the trial 
sequences observed by the subjects were fed to the model to produce trial-by-trial 
estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level. Then, for each experimental cell, the 
mean volatility and predicted conflict level were computed, excluding trials that were 
excluded in empirical data analysis. Finally, to link model predictions to the empirical 
data, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed using group means of the 
parameter estimates (28 conditions), which were then fit to the group mean of RTs. 
Specifically, this GLM contained 6 regressors (i.e. free parameters), namely the volatility, 
the predicted conflict level, and the grand mean, separately for congruent and 
incongruent trials. Note that this fitting procedure is not geared at finding the optimal 
parameters for the model. Rather, the purpose of this fitting was similar to within-trial 
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simulation, or in other words, to quantify how predictions made prior to a trial influence 
the information processing during that trial, as reflected in the RTs.  
3.1.5 Results and Discussion 
The subjects performed the task with high accuracy (mean = 92.9%). The 3-way 
ANOVA on empirical RTs showed a significant effect of current congruency (F,QQ = 
57.07,  P < 0.001), due to longer RTs in incongruent trials (592 ± 11 ms) than in congruent 
trials (569 ± 10 ms). An interaction between proportion incongruency and current 
congruency was also found (the proportion congruent effect, F,QQ = 2.73,  P < 0.03), 
driven by a decrease in interference effects as the proportion of incongruent trials 
increased (Figure 11a). There was also an interaction between previous and current trial 
congruency (the conflict adaptation effect, F,QQ = 5.03,  P < 0.03), driven by a larger 
interference effect (26 ± 3 ms) in post-congruent trials than in post-congruent trials (16 ± 
3 ms; Figure 11b). Thus, the behavioral results replicated a large literature on the 
proportion incongruency (for review, see Bugg & Crump, 2012) and the conflict 
adaptation effect (for review, see Egner, 2007), as well as previous findings of these two 
effects occurring simultaneously in the same data set (Torres-Quesada et al., 2013). As 
can be seen in Figure 11c, both effects were successfully simulated using theBayesian 
model. Specifically, the model predicted an interference effect (congruent trials: 569 ms; 
incongruent trials: 592 ms), a decreased interference effect as the proportion of 
incongruent trials increased (Figure 11d), and a higher interference effect in post-
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congruent trials (27 ms) than in post-incongruent trials (18 ms). These simulation results 
suggest that the Bayesian model is able to simultaneously account for both long-term 
and short-term effects of cognitive control. These fits were achieved using a single 
control mechanism with a flexible learning rate rather than the dual mechanism 
structure of De Piasapia & Braver (2006) or the separate fits with different learning rates 
as applied by Botvinick and colleagues (2001). Moreover, the data fits were derived from 
on-the-fly simulations and not based post-hoc setting of learning rate parameters.  
 
Figure 11:  Empirical and simulated effects of congruency, proportion 
incongruency, and conflict adaptation. (a) Empirical proportion incongruency effect, 
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with RT plotted as a function current trial congruency and the block-wise proportion 
of incongruent trials. (b) Empirical conflict adaptation effect, with RT plotted as a 
function of current and previous trial congruency. (c) Simulated proportion 
incongruency effect, plotted in the same way as in (a). (d) Simulated conflict 
adaptation effect, plotted in the same way as in (b). Pre C/Pre I = Preceded by a 
congruent/incongruent trial; Current C/Current I = current trial is 
congruent/incongruent. 
 
3.2 Simulating the Flexibility of Conflict-control 
To further demonstrate the model’s ability to simulate the flexibility of cognitive 
control, a second experiment was conducted, in which I created two environments with 
different dependence on short-term and long-term information. I show that the model 
can successfully simulate the behavioral patterns observed in the empirical data. 
3.2.1 Subjects 
 Forty-six healthy volunteers (mean age = 19.9, 33 females) gave informed 
consent in accordance with institutional guidelines. All subjects were native or highly 
proficient English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
3.2.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The same stimuli and basic task procedure was used as the one described above 
in section 3.2. 
3.2.3 Experimental Design 
This task consisted of 4 runs of 9 blocks each. Each block contained 20 trials with 
pseudo-randomized congruency. The first block had 50% congruent trials and served as 
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a burn-in block to bring the predictions to the same baseline at the beginning of each 
run. To create experimental environments that differ in their dependence on long-term 
and short-term trial history, a run could be either volatile (the proportion incongruency 
altered between 20% and 80% every block) or stable (the proportion incongruency 
remained either 20% or 80% for all 8 post-reset blocks). The order of volatile and stable 
runs was counter-balanced across subjects. This manipulation resulted in a 2 (volatile / 
stable) × 2 (proportion incongruency) × 2 (current trial congruency) factorial design. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
The same analyses were applied as described in section 3.1.4. Note that trials in 
burn-in blocks were also given to the model, so as to also generate a reset of trial-by-trial 
estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level in the model at the beginning of each 
run. However, reset block trials were excluded from further analyses. 
3.2.5 Results and Discussion 
Participants performed the task with high accuracy (mean = 92.8%) in this task. 
The 3-way ANOVA on empirical RTs again revealed a significant effect of current trial 
congruency (F,KQ = 49.3, P < 0.001), due to longer RTs in incongruent trials (549 ± 13 ms) 
than in congruent trials (522 ± 11 ms). The proportion incongruency effect was also 
found, reflected in a significant interaction between proportion incongruency and 
current trial congruency (F,KQ = 10.5, P = 0.002). This effect was driven by a larger 
interference effect in 80% congruency blocks (33 ± 5 ms) than in 20% congruency blocks 
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(22 ± 4 ms). Importantly, asignificant main effect of volatility was observed (F,KQ = 4.5, P 
= 0.04), due to longer RTs in volatile runs (540 ± 12 ms) than in stable runs (531 ± 12 ms). 
Note that this main effect was not driven by “outliers” in experimental cells, because no 
interactions involving volatility and any of the other factors were found. Furthermore, a 
trend for longer RTs in volatile compared to stable environments can be observed in all 4 
current trial congruency × proportion incongruency conditions (Figure 12a).  
 
Figure 12: Empirical and simulated effects of congruency, proportion 
incongruency in an environment of changing volatility. All quantities are plotted as a 
function of volatility, proportion incongruency and congruency at the current trial. (a) 
Empirical reaction times and their standard errors. (b) Simulated reaction time. (c) 
Estimated predicted conflict level from the Bayesian model. (d) Estimated volatility 
from the Bayesian model in arbitrary units. C/I in 20%/80% C = 
congruent/incongruent trials in a block of 20%/80% congruent trials. 
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This pattern of RTs was again successfully simulated using the model (Figure 
12b): firstly, the model recapitulated the main effect of current congruency (congruent 
trials: 522 ms; incongruent trials: 549 ms); secondly, it simulated the proportion 
incongruency effect (inference effect in high proportion incongruency blocks: 33 ms; 
inference effect in low proportion incongruency blocks: 22 ms); and lastly (and most 
importantly), it predicted longer RTs in volatile runs (540 ms) than in stable runs (531 
ms). I contend that this “volatility cost” performance pattern can in fact only be 
accounted for by using a model that estimates the volatility of the environment. 
Consider a model with no information about volatility (e.g. having a fixed learning rate): 
in such a model, each trial’s contribution to the prediction of predicted conflict level is a 
constant. Furthermore, the trial’s contribution to the prediction of all forthcoming trials 
is also a nearly constant, because its influence decays continuously with a constant 
discounting rate after each trial, and approaches zero in a relatively short period of time 
(except for extremely low learning rates, which are unrealistic given  the commonly 
observed short-term effects of cognitive control). As a consequence, using a fixed 
learning rate, two sequences of trials with the same proportion incongruency and 
number of trials will produce the same sum of conflict-level estimates across all trials, 
regardless of the volatility of those sequences. Indeed, even as shown in the model, 
estimates of predicted conflict level displayed an interaction between volatility and 
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proportion incongruency (Figure 12c). Thus, it is impossible to account for the pattern of 
slower RTs in volatile compared to stable runs in the empirical dataset when using only 
predicted conflict level estimates; they would have to be combined with estimates of 
volatility (Figure 12d) to simulate the empirical data pattern. To further illustrate this 
point, I performed an additional analysis to simulate the results in this experiment using 
a reinforcement learning algorithm. Specifically, I created 3 learners with different 
learning rates: 0.05 (high dependence on long-term information), 0.5 (balanced 
dependence on long-term and short-term information) and 0.95 (high dependence on 
short-term information). The learning was conducted using the following equation: 
 f = f × 1 , α + o × α (Eq 13) 
Where  f is the predicted conflict level at trial i+1, α is the learning rate, and o 
is the observed congruency. If any of these learners were able to account for the 
behavioral pattern observed in experiment 2, there should be a significant difference in 
f between the 2 volatility levels, because f is the only output of these learners. 
However, in none of the 3 learners was such significant a difference (all Ps > 0.2) 
observed. Thus, in the absence of a (volatility-modulated) flexible learning rate, the 
model is unable to account for the behavioral patterns obtained across different task 
settings. 
      Note that the predicted conflict levels display the inverse pattern of empirical 
RTs, e.g., for incongruent trials higher estimated (or predicted) conflict levels are 
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predictive of faster RTs. This pattern essentially corresponds to the classic, intuitive 
explanation of the empirical proportion incongruency effect, namely, that control is 
higher in conditions where conflict is frequently encountered (e.g., Carter et al., 1998). 
A few additional points should be noted in the interpretation of these data. First, 
both conflict adaptation and proportion incongruency effects have at times been argued 
to exclusively reflect associative processes related to the particular stimulus and 
response features of the task (e.g., Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt and 
Besner, 2008). By contrast, the present results show that both of these effects can be 
faithfully captured by a model that does not consider specific stimulus or response 
features at all – it only learns about the incidence of congruent and incongruent stimuli. 
This documents that, at least in principle, learning of specific physical stimulus and 
response properties is not a necessary precondition for producing these effects. Second, 
while this main effect of volatility can be quantitatively accounted for by the Bayesian 
model (the manipulation of volatility was captured by the volatility variable, as can be 
seen in Figure 12c), the model architecture itself does not necessitate such an effect. In 
other words, the model could equally well fit behavioral data in the absence of a main 
effect of volatility (as observed in other, unpublished observations).  
Nevertheless, this does of course not mean that the empirical data themselves 
were not potentially subject to such lower-level learning effects. It is unlikely that such 
processes contributed in a substantial manner to the present results, however, for the 
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following reasons. First, in order to prevent trial-by-trial priming effects at the level of 
physical stimulus features (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003), 
face stimuli in the present experiments never repeated across successive trials, and the 
lettering of the distracter labels alternated between lower- and upper-case across trials. 
Second, in order to minimize the possibility that proportion incongruency effects in the 
protocol would be mediated by subjects associating specific face stimuli with a 
particular response (e.g., the gender-congruent response in high proportion 
incongruency blocks), the stimuli included a large number (24) of unique facial identities 
(cf. (Bugg & Hutchison, 2013)). Nonetheless, this leaves the possibility that subjects may 
use the contingency between the distracter (in this case, the gender word) and the 
response to guide their action selection (Bugg, 2012; Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Schmidt & 
Besner, 2008). For example, in an environment of high proportion incongruency, the 
gender word is highly predictive of the correct response. However, note that in volatile 
runs, this contingency changes every 10 occurrences for each word (on average), leading 
to a less predictive word-response association than in stable runs, where the contingency 
remains unchanged. Therefore, if distracter-response contingency were a major 
contributing factor to the proportion incongruency effect in the data, this effect should 
be modulated by the contingency’s predictive power (i.e., volatility), resulting in a 3-way 
interaction between volatility, proportion incongruency and current-trial congruency. 
However, such an interaction was not observed (F,KQ = 2.9, n.s.). More specifically, the 
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contingency account predicts that contingency with higher predictive power (i.e., the 
stable runs) should evoke larger proportion incongruency effects than low-contingency 
conditions (i.e., the volatile runs). However, numerically, the opposite is true for the 
present data (volatile runs: proportion incongruency effect = 16 ± 5 ms; stable runs: 
proportion incongruency effect = 4 ± 4 ms; tKQ = 1.7, n.s.). Thus, contingency learning 
seems highly unlikely to have contributed to the empirical proportion incongruency 
effects that the model simulated.  
In sum, I showed that a Bayesian model that learns to predict control demand 
using a flexible, volatility-driven learning rate, can account for simultaneously occurring 
conflict adaptation, proportion incongruency, and volatility effects, without the need for 
multiple controllers or post-hoc fit-derived learning rate parameters. I conclude that this 
model represents a promising new application of a Bayesian approach to exploring 
computational mechanisms of cognitive control, in particular with respect to simulating 
the flexibility that is required of control processes wielded in a changing environment.   
3.3 Simulating the Flexibility of Conflict-control Using Model-
based Analysis 
The two studies above have established the validity of the Bayesian model in 
accounting for behavioral data from tasks that requires flexible cognitive control. The 
study presented in this section extends those studies in two ways: (1) replicating the 
experiment in section 3.2 with a different timing setting by adopting jittered ISIs that is 
more suitable for event-related fMRI studies, and (2) by introducing a model-based, 
 59 
trial-based analysis method that overcomes several limitations in the conventional, 
condition-based ANOVA I used above. 
3.3.1 Subjects 
Fifty-five subjects gave informed consent online in accordance with institutional 
guidelines and participated in this study through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 
which is an online cloud-sourcing platform that can be adapted for fast and efficient 
data acquisition for behavioral tasks (see Appendix A for details). Two subjects were 
excluded from analysis due to chance-level accuracy. The remaining 53 subjects self-
reported demographic information online (36 females; mean age, 32).  
3.3.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli used in this study were the same as the ones described above in 
section 3.2.2, except that two more distracter word labels (“man” and “woman”) were 
added, to further reduce the efficacy of employing a contingency learning strategy 
during this task. Stimulus delivery and response recording were carried out by 
JavaScript. The size of face images were fixed at 216 × 270 pixels and always presented 
in the center of the browser window against a grey background. Lower-case and upper-
case distracter words were presented in font sizes of 80 and 60 points respectively to 
match the space they covered on the screen. Stimuli were separated by exponentially 
jittered ISIs (range = 4-6s, step size = 1s). 
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Fifty-five online assignments of this task were posted simultaneously on AMT. 
Potential participants interested in this task were able to first read the online instructions 
and complete a brief practice session consisting of 24 trials. After the practice session, 
they had the option to formally participate in this study (i.e., to take one of the 55 
assignments from AMT). The subjects that agreed to participate in this study then gave 
informed consent and filled out a demographic survey. They then proceeded to the task, 
which was hosted on Dropbox (https://www.dropbox.com/). After the subjects 
completed the task, the JavaScript submitted their responses along with stimulus 
delivery information to AMT. Finally, the subjects were compensated at the rate of ~$3 
per hour through the AMT payment system. In accordance with AMT policy and 
institutional guidelines, a payment was made if (1) a subject finished the task and 
submitted their responses and stimulus delivery information and (2) the performance 
met a pre-specified requirement. 
3.3.3 Experimental Design 
The experimental design was identical to the one described above in section 
3.2.3, except that the experiment consisted of 8 runs, each of which had five blocks, 
including a burn-in block. Both of the first and the last four runs contained two volatile 
and two stable runs (one for each proportion incongruency). The order of volatile and 
stable runs was counter-balanced within and across subjects. 
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3.3.4 Data Analysis 
First, the analysis described above in section 3.2.4 was here repeated as a 
comparison to the previous study. Incorrect trials, post-error trials, outlier trials (RT 
values that deviated >2.5 SDs from an individual subject’s grand mean), and post-outlier 
trials were excluded from further analysis. In addition, a model-based, trial-based 
analysis was performed. Specifically, the sequence of trial congruency (concatenated 
across runs) experienced for each subject was processed by the Bayesian model to 
generate trial-based estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level. Variable 
estimates and congruency for excluded trials were discarded. The remaining estimates 
were grouped into a chronological vector for each model variable. These vectors were 
then normalized and multiplied to form 7 variable vectors (volatility, predicted conflict 
level, congruency, and their 2-way and 3-way interactions). Subsequently, these vectors 
were grouped, along with a constant vector, to form a general linear model (GLM). To 
test the effect of each of the 7 variable vectors while ensuring that effects were not 
confounded by shared variance with any of the other variables, the “test variable” vector 
was first regressed against the other variable vectors. The residual resulting from this 
regression (after removal of all shared variance with the other variables) was then fit as a 
predictor to the RT vector, along with other six variable vectors in the GLM as nuisance 
effects. RTs were normalized within subjects prior to regression to remove potential 
biases due to individual variance in RT magnitude.  The resulting fitting coefficient for 
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the test variable vector was then tested against 0 using a one-sample t-test across 
subjects.  
3.3.5 Results and Discussion 
Participants performed the task with high accuracy (mean = 96.5%). The 3-way 
ANOVA (condition-based analysis) on empirical RTs again revealed a significant effect 
of current trial congruency (F,Q7 = 89.0, P < 0.001), due to longer RTs in incongruent 
trials (550 ± 19 ms) than in congruent trials (511 ± 18 ms). The proportion incongruency 
effect was also found, reflected in a significant interaction between proportion 
incongruency and current trial congruency (F,Q7 = 4.79, P = 0.033). This effect was driven 
by a larger interference effect in 80% congruency blocks (43 ± 5 ms) than in 20% 
congruency blocks (34 ± 4 ms).  
Similarly, the trial-based analysis also revealed a significant effect of current trial 
congruency (M7S = 9.1, P < 0.0001) and a significant negative interaction between 
predicted conflict level and current trial congruency (M7S = 2.1, P = 0.04). The negative 
direction of the interaction conforms to the condition-based analysis, suggesting reduced 
interference effect in trials with high predicted conflict level. 
Both analyses revealed significant effects of interference and adjustment of 
cognitive control (proportion incongruency × congruency interaction and predicted 
conflict level × congruency interaction in the condition-based and trial-based analyses, 
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respectively). Thus even with the longer ISIs needed for fMRI scanning, this design is 
still able to elicit these classic behavioral phenomena of cognitive control.  
Despite of the similarity of results from the two analyses, it should be noted that 
the nature of these analyses differs fundamentally. Specifically, compared to the 
conventional condition-based approach, this approach has three advantages: (1) unlike 
the condition-based approach, the trial-based nature of the present approach takes the 
trial-by-trial variance into consideration, thus making it more sensitive in theory; (2) the 
residual analysis ensures that any variance explained can only be attributed to the 
specific variable / interaction tested, because any variance shared with other variable 
vectors has been removed. Thus the trial-based analysis is a more stringent test than the 
condition-based approach; (3) most importantly, one crucial goal in this dissertation is to 
unify different forms of adjustment of cognitive control that rely on different integration 
of short-term (e.g., conflict adaptation effect) and long-term (e.g., proportion 
incongruency effect) information. However, the condition-based approach fails to 
integrate these, because the previous trial congruency and the proportion incongruency 
must be modeled as separate factors in a factorial design. From the perspective of the 
Bayesian model, this integration is natural because the predicted conflict level is already 
an integration of both short-term and long-term information. Its interaction with 
congruency is in turn a joint effect of both the conflict adaptation effect and the 
proportion incongruency effect. 
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Moreover, despite adding two more distracter labels to further discourage the 
use of a contingency learning strategy, the still-significant behavioral effects in both 
analyses suggests that these effects were not due to learning based on features of the 
stimuli but reflected genuine adjustments of cognitive control. To further test this claim, 
I compared the effect of proportion incongruency × congruency interaction between the 
data from section 3.2 and this section. The contingency learning argument would predict 
that this interaction should be higher in the data from section 3.2 than the data from this 
study. However, there was no significant difference of the proportion incongruency × 
congruency interaction between these two datasets (MNN = -0.28, n.s.), again suggesting 
that the effects were mainly driven by the adjustment based on conflict or trial 
congruency.    
Another interesting point to note in the present data set is that the main effect of 
volatility was not significant, as confirmed by both the condition-based and trial-based 
analyses. Because a main effect of volatility was observed in two independent datasets 
(see section 3.2 and the appendix), it is unlikely that this main effect represents a type II 
error. Why did we not observe this main effect of volatility in the present data set then? 
Compared to those two datasets, the present task has two key differences: there were 
two additional distracter labels and longer ISIs. The discussion above has discounted the 
possibility that the former difference induced any change in behavioral patterns. Thus, I 
speculate that the longer ISIs might have caused the absence of the main effect of 
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volatility. Short ISIs may encourage subjects to make faster, premature responses (e.g., 
select an action before sufficient evidence has been accumulated from processing the 
stimulus). Low volatility also indicates better precision of predicted congruency 
(Behrens et al., 2007), thus allowing for less adjustment of cognitive control within a trial, 
which may result in faster RT. Nevertheless, future studies are necessary to examine this 
speculation.  
Taken together, this study has demonstrated that the experimental design is 
suitable for an fMRI study and validated the trial-based analysis.  
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4. The Neural Mechanisms of Flexible Cognitive Control 
Although the neural mechanisms underlying the adjustment of cognitive control 
have been extensively inspected, few studies have targeted the flexibility of such 
adjustment. Most of these studies mainly focused on either the adjustment depending 
on short-term information (e.g., the conflict adaptation effect, (M. Botvinick et al., 1999; 
Durston et al., 2003; Egner & Hirsch, 2005a, 2005b; Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004)), or the 
adjustment depending on long-term information (e.g., the proportion incongruency 
effect, (Grandjean et al., 2012; Krug & Carter, 2012; Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2000; Wilk, Ezekiel, & Morton, 2012) ). The only neuroimaging study that 
investigated both effects modeled these effects separately due to the limitation of 
condition-based analysis and did not find any brain regions significantly displaying 
either effect (Torres-Quesada, Franziska, Funes, Lupianez, & Egner, 2014). Nevertheless, 
many of the studies above found adjustment-related activation in the ACC and dlPFC, 
regardless of whether they investigated the short-term or long-term effects. Thus there 
may be a unified neural mechanism supporting both effects. Or more broadly, this 
mechanism may support flexible adjustment of cognitive control by integrating 
information sampled from various temporal resolutions.  
The Bayesian model provides a natural integration of long-term and short-term 
information and thus represents a novel tool for the quest of exploring the neural 
mechanism of flexible adjustment of cognitive control. Furthermore, the mechanisms of 
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the Bayesian model generates a few specific predictions regarding how this integration 
is carried out: (1) the updating of predicted conflict level is modulated by volatility; (2) 
cognitive control is regulated by the predicted conflict level; (3) the updating of volatility 
is guided by the (unsigned) prediction error of conflict. In the following sections of this 
chapter, I present an fMRI study that investigated the flexible adjustment of cognitive 
control using the Bayesian model and an experimental manipulation that created two 
environments with different reliance on long-term and short-term information (based on 
the task design described above under section 3.3.3).  
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Materials 
Twenty-one healthy, right-handed volunteers (8 females, mean age = 26 years) 
gave informed consent in accordance with institutional guidelines. All subjects were 
native or highly proficient English-speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision.  
4.1.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
The stimuli used were identical to those used in section 3.3.2. Stimulus delivery 
and behavioral data collection were carried out using Presentation 
(http://www.neurobs.com/). Visual stimuli were presented on a back projection screen 
viewed via a mirror attached to the scanner headcoil, and responses were collected 
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using an MRI-compatible button box. The stimuli subtended approximately 3° of 
horizontal and 4° of vertical visual angle. 
4.1.3 Procedure and Task Design 
The procedure and task design were the same as the ones used in section 3.3.3, 
except that the length of burn-in blocks were reduced to 16 trials.  
4.1.4 Image Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Images were acquired parallel to the AC-PC line on a 3T GE scanner (Milwaukee, 
WI). Structural images were scanned using a T1-weighted SPGR axial scan sequence 
(146 slices, slice thickness = 1mm, TR = 8.124ms, FoV = 256mm * 256mm, in-plane 
resolution = 1mm * 1mm). Functional images were scanned using a T2*-weighted single-
shot gradient EPI sequence of 39 contiguous axial slices (slice thickness = 3mm, TR = 2s, 
TE = 28ms, flip angle = 90 °, FoV = 192mm * 192mm, in-plane resolution = 3mm * 3mm). 
Functional data were acquired in 8 runs of 240 images each. Preprocessing was done 
using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). After discarding the first five scans of 
each run, the remaining images were realigned to their mean image and corrected for 
differences in slice-time acquisition. Each subject’s structural image was co-registered to 
the mean functional image and normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
template brain. The transformation parameters of the structural image normalization 
were then applied to the functional images. Normalized functional images were kept in 
their native resolution.  
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To gauge the trial-wise activation in the fMRI data, a task model was built for 
each run. Similar to the behavioral studies reported above, error trials, post-error trials, 
outliers (i.e., trials with RTs greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean), post-
outlier trials, and burn-in trials were excluded from further analyses. A task model 
consisted of regressors representing the onset of each non-excluded trial, along with 5 
nuisance regressors representing the onsets of each type of excluded trials and 2 other 
nuisance regressors separately encoding onsets of left and right button-presses. This task 
model was then convolved with SPM 8’s canonical hemodynamic response function. 
The convolved tasked model was appended by regressors representing head motion 
parameters and the grand mean of the run to form a design matrix, against which the 
normalized functional images were regressed. The resulting activation maps were then 
concatenated across runs. As the final output of preprocessing, each grey matter (GM) 
voxel obtained an activation vector that chronologically represented the activation level 
at each trial. These activation vectors were used for fMRI analyses below. 
4.1.5 Data Analysis 
The trial sequences of congruency exposed to each subject was processed by the 
Bayesian model to generate trial-by-trial estimates of volatility and predicted conflict 
level. These estimates first underwent a sanity check (see next section), and then entered 
the analyses for behavioral data and fMRI data. Estimates corresponding to excluded 
trials were also discarded from further analyses. 
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4.1.5.1 Sanity Check for Model Estimates 
Similar to the analysis in section 2.2.3, to examine whether the Bayesian model is 
sensitive to the manipulation of volatility in this task, the mean volatility in volatile runs 
was compared to the mean volatility in stable runs using a paired t-test across subjects. 
4.1.5.2 Behavioral Analysis 
The behavioral analysis was conducted using both the conventional 3-way 
ANOVA (volatility × proportion incongruency × current trial congruency) described in 
section 3.2.5 and the trial-based analysis using residual of variable vectors as described 
in section 3.3.4.  
4.1.5.3 Searchlight-based Analyses Investigating Neural Representation of Model 
Variables 
For determining the encoding of model variables and (their interactions), we 
examined two possible coding schemes: a “homogeneous”, univariate scheme, where 
information is encoded by local voxel populations with similar response properties (e.g., 
a group of voxels whose fMRI signal magnitudes all scale positively with predicted 
conflict), and a “heterogeneous”, distributed scheme, where information is encoded in 
multivariate activation patterns over local voxel populations(Turk-Browne, 2013). To 
account for these schemes, a univariate analysis and a multi-variate pattern analysis 
(MVPA) were conducted in parallel (Clithero, Carter, & Huettel, 2009). Both analyses 
were carried out with a searchlight approach (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006) 
that scanned through small clusters (radius: 2 voxels) of GM voxels . Within each 
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searchlight, the univariate analysis assessed homogeneous encoding by amplitude by 
fitting the variable vector to the searchlight mean activation vector. The univariate 
analysis was conducted via a two-fold averaging approach between the first and last 
four scanning runs. Each half contained two volatile runs and two stables runs (one for 
each proportion of incongruent trials) and was tested separately. The results were 
averaged across the two halves to reduce the impact of outliers.  The MVPA quantified 
distributed encoding by the amount of signal variance in a model variable vector that 
could be explained by the mean-centered activation vectors from all voxels in a given 
searchlight through linear regression. The removal of searchlight mean signals renders 
the MVPA independent from the univariate analysis. Over-fitting was controlled for by 
a two-fold cross-validation scheme between the first and last four scanning runs. To 
ensure the unique attribution of fMRI signal to a given variable, all other variable and 
interaction vectors were used as nuisance variables in both analyses.  
For each analysis, the quantification of encoding was mapped to the center voxel 
of each searchlight to form a spatial map of information content. The map was then 
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 6mm (2 voxels) radius. One-sample t-tests were 
then conducted on the maps across individual maps to test for group-level effects of 
homogeneous encoding and distributed encoding. 
Statistical results were corrected for multiple comparisons at P < 0.05 for 
combined searchlight classification accuracy and cluster extent thresholds, using the 
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AFNI ClusterSim algorithm.  10,000 Monte Carlo simulations determined that an 
uncorrected voxelwise p value threshold of < 0.01 in combination with a searchlight 
cluster size 30 to 35 searchlights (depending on the specific contrast) ensured a false 
discovery rate of < 0.05. 
4.1.5.4 Inspecting the Modulation of Volatility on the Learning Rates of Predicted 
Conflict Level 
The function of volatility in the Bayesian model suggests that the volatility belief 
modulates the updating (or learning) of the neural coding of predicted conflict level. To 
test this hypothesis, I first extracted the neural coding of predicted conflict level with no 
assumption from the Bayesian model. For each searchlight in the caudate ROI (see 
below),  its GM voxels’ activation vectors were applied to fit the variable vector of 
congruency using linear regression, and the fitted activation vector (i.e., the regression 
coefficient-weighted sum of activation vectors) was used as the model-free activation 
vector of predicted conflict level. This is because that the linear regression minimized the 
sum of square error between the observed congruency and the predicted conflict level, 
and hence the fitted activation vector can be considered as the best approximation of 
congruency (or prediction of conflict level) based on activation vectors in the searchlight. 
Consistent with the Bayesian model, in the linear regression, congruent and incongruent 
trials were represented as 0 and 1 respectively. To constrain the predicted conflict level 
between the range of 0 and 1, off-limit values (< 0 or > 1) were set to their closest limits in 
the fitted activation vector.. Finally, the ROI mean model-free activation vector of 
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predicted conflict level averaged was used to estimate learning rates using the 
reinforcement learning algorithm.  
The prediction error at each trial in the fitted activation vector was then 
calculated as T& , UVW, where UVW is the activation in the fitted activation vector at trial X. The 
updating was calculated as UVY , UVW. The learning rate α can then be estimated across 
trials by a linear regression of: 
UVY , UVW = ZT& , UVW (Eq 14) 
To compare the learning rates between trials with high volatility and trials with 
low volatility, the ROI mean model-free activation vector of predicted conflict level was 
divided into 2 vectors based on a mean-split of the volatility estimates. For each vector, 
the learning rate was estimated using the method described above. The estimated 
learning rates were then compared between the two vectors across subjects via a paired 
t-test. 
To further test the modulation of volatility on learning rates, an updated linear 
model was applied to the neural coding of predicted conflict level: 
  
UVY , UVW = Z[T& , UVW\ 
α = 1 + 	β]& (Eq 15) 
This new linear model defines a linear correlation between the learning rate α 
and the volatility ]&. Importantly, the sign of modulation index β is predicted to be 
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positive by the Bayesian model, indicating a larger learning rate in a more volatile 
environment. This linear model was then applied to estimating β, which was further 
tested against 0 using a one-sample t-test across subjects. 
4.1.5.5 Using the Interaction between Predicted Conflict Level and Congruency as a 
Measure of Prediction Error of Congruency 
After normalization, the congruent and incongruent trials were represented as -1 
and 1, respectively. The normalized predicted conflict level f represents the (belief of 
the) probability of encountering an incongruent trial. Assuming f is centered as re-
scaled between -1 and 1, the unsigned prediction error of congruency can then be 
quantified using the negative of the interaction term between predicted conflict level 
and congruency, ,f × o.The unsigned prediction error of congruency, formally 
formulated as: 
D 1 , U&, XU	T& = 11 + U&, XU	T& = ,1 (Eq 16) 
can be further re-formulated to 1 , f × o. In the context of a regression analysis, 
the constant 1 can furthermore be discarded without affecting the results. In fact, 
although the normalized f was not re-scaled between -1 and 1 in the analyses, ,f × o 
can still be used as prediction error multiplied by the re-scaling factor. 
4.2 Results 
In the present study, the model was employed to generate trial-by-trial variable 
parameter estimates that allow following analyses to delineate the neural substrates 
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mediating these putative control computations. Specifically, I gauged neural dynamics 
relating to three core hypothesized mechanisms inherent in the model: (1) updating of 
predicted conflict level should be modulated by beliefs about volatility (2) predicted 
conflict level drives cognitive control, and therefore modulates the effect of congruency 
on neural processing; (3) congruency prediction error drives the adjustment of volatility 
estimates. 
4.2.1 The Bayesian Model Captures Behavioral Patterns in Flexible 
Adjustment of Cognitive Control 
Subjects performed the task with high accuracy (mean accuracy = 94.2%). A 
three-way ANOVA (volatility × proportion of incongruent trials × current trial 
congruency) revealed a main effect of proportion of incongruent trials (J,7S = 4.77, P = 
0.041) due to better accuracy in blocks of 20% incongruent trials (94.8% ± 1.0) than blocks 
of 80% incongruent trials (93.2% ± 1.2), and a main effect of current trial congruency 
(J,7S = 9.15, P = 0.007), caused by better accuracy in congruent (94.9% ± 1.2) than 
incongruent (93.1% ± 1.0) trials. In RT, a three-way ANOVA detected a significant main 
effect of current trial congruency (F,7S = 20.4, P < 0.0001), driven by a slower RT in 
incongruent trials (456ms) than congruent trials (416ms). The Bayesian model was then 
used to simulate behavioral data on a trial-by-trial basis (Figure 13b). In brief, the 
individual subjects’ trial sequences were processed by the model to produce trial-by-trial 
estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level.  The estimates of predicted conflict 
level tracked the time course of the underlying proportion congruency very closely 
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(Figure 13c), and the model estimate of volatility was higher for the volatile than the 
stable runs (Figure 13d, paired t-test, F7S = 16.38, P < 0.0001). These results indicate that 
the model beliefs successfully tracked the experimental manipulations. I next employed 
the three model variables (trial-wise estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level, 
and the observed congruency) and their interactions (i.e., a total of seven variables, 
resembling a three-way ANOVA) to account for the variance in RT using the regression 
analysis described above in sections 3.3.4 and 4.1.5.2. The trial-based analysis showed 
co-variance between RTs and observed congruency, with slower responses associated 
with incongruent trials (M7S = 5.75, P < 0.0001, Figure 13e). In addition, this analysis 
found a significant positive correlation between prediction error of congruency 
(quantified as ,U& × o&) and RT  (t7S = -3.28, P < 0.005, Figure 13f), showing that superior 
conflict level prediction was associated with faster responses.  
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Figure 13: Experimental task, Bayesian model, and simulation and behavioral 
results. (a) Example stimuli and timing of the present task. This example depicts an 
incongruent trial, followed by a congruent trial. (b) The graphical representation of 
the Bayesian model of flexible conflict-control. The model uses 3 variables, volatility 
(), conflict (), and observation (, shown in grey indicating this variable is 
observable) for each trial. The directed edges indicate the information flow. (c) Time 
course of the estimated predicted conflict level (in red) and the underlying proportion 
congruency level (in black) in an example session. (d) Group mean model belief of 
volatility and its mean standard error (MSE), plotted as a function of run type. (e) 
Group mean normalized RT, plotted as a function of congruency (Cog = congruent 
trials; Inc = incongruent trials). (f) Group mean of normalized RT, plotted as a 
function of prediction error of congruency. 
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4.2.2 Encoding of Model Variables in the Brain 
The most basic assumption of our model is that the three model variables 
(volatility, predicted conflict, congruency) are represented in the brain. Thus, before 
validating the hypotheses that concern specific dynamic interactions between model 
components, I first tested this fundamental hypothesis using the searchlight-based 
analyses described above in section 4.1.5.3.   
 
Figure 14: A graphical representation of the hierarchy of information 
processing in a single trial, between model variables (left) and brain areas showing 
significant co-variation (P < 0.05, corrected) between fMRI activation and these model 
variables (right, from top to bottom: volatility, predicted conflict level, and 
congruency). Select brain regions encoding the model variables are shown in the box 
linked to the corresponding variable. 
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The test for neural representation of each of the model variables found the 
estimated volatility of control-demand to be tracked by activity in the bilateral insula 
and adjacent inferior frontal gyri, amygdala, putamen, and right parahippocampal 
gyrus and precuneus (Figure 14; P < 0.05, corrected) via a homogenous (univariate) 
coding scheme. Predicted conflict levels were encoded in the right caudate (Figure 14; P 
< 0.05, corrected) via a heterogeneous (multivariate) coding scheme. Additionally, 
predicted conflict levels were encoded in a homogeneous fashion in the left inferior 
parietal lobule, right paracentral lobule and superior frontal gyrus. Finally, observed 
congruency was tracked by signals in medial frontal cortex, in particular the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), as well as in bilateral inferior frontal gyri and 
superior parietal lobule, left inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and precuneus (Figure 14; P < 
0.05, corrected; univariate coding). The latter results broadly replicate previous findings 
from studies of Stroop-type conflict effects (Jiang & Egner, 2013).  
In sum, the initial analyses portray a distributed network of frontal, parietal and 
subcortical regions that encode volatility of control demand and observed congruency, 
while the caudate nucleus appears to play a central role in the prediction of conflict 
(control-demand). In the following, specific model-derived hypotheses concerning 
dynamic interactions between model nodes are tested.  
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4.2.3 Volatility-modulated Updating of Predicted Conflict Level in the 
Caudate 
Prior to stimulus presentation in a given trial, the Bayesian model updates 
predicted conflict level by integrating the most recently observed congruency, 
modulated by the model’s belief of volatility (Figure 15a). As described above, the model 
assumes that high volatility drives up the learning rate to allow for a stronger weighting 
of short-term information in predicting forthcoming congruency. To test this hypothesis, 
I performed a learning rate estimation analysis on the caudate searchlights that have 
been shown to encode the predicted conflict level (see section 4.1.5.4). For each 
searchlight in each subject, I mean-split the data into low-volatility versus high-volatility 
trials, and estimated the learning rate for each half employing a traditional RL algorithm 
(Sutton, 1988). Across subjects, it was found that the ROI mean estimated learning rate 
was significantly higher in trials with higher volatility (Figure 15b, M7S = 4.51, P = 0.0002). 
I further tested the modulation of volatility on learning rate in the activation vectors in 
the caudate. A significant positive modulation (i.e., learning rate increases with volatility) 
was observed (Figure 15c, M7S = 6.31, P < 0.0001). These results provide strong evidence 
that volatility modulates the updating of neural representations in the caudate that 
encode the anticipated demand on cognitive control. 
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Figure 15: Modulation of volatility on brain activity encoding predicted 
conflict level. (a) A graphical representation of the Bayesian model, highlighting in 
red the information processing mechanisms related to the modulation of volatility on 
predicted conflict level. (b) Comparison of caudate activity-derived learning rates 
between high and low volatility trials. Each line represents a participant. (c) Group 
mean modulation of volatility on caudate activity-derived learning rate and its mean 
standard error (MSE). (d) Visualization of caudate searchlights showing encoding of 
predicted conflict level (red, P < 0.05 corrected) and caudate searchlights showing 
interaction between volatility and prediction error of congruency (green, P < 0.05 
corrected) and their overlap (yellow). (e) Histogram of t-values measuring group level 
univariate effect of volatility × prediction error of congruency interaction. The t-
values were calculated from searchlights in the caudate ROI. The red vertical line 
denotes the threshold for statistical significance (P < 0.05). (f) Activation in the 
caudate ROI, plotted as a function of volatility and prediction error of congruency. 
If the belief of volatility regulates the updating of predicted conflict level, as 
suggested by the present and previous behavioral and modeling results, then it can be 
predicted that volatility also modulates the neural representation of prediction error of 
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congruency, which is another driving factor in the updating of predicted conflict level. 
Compared to a volatile condition, a stable condition should down-regulate the 
representation of short-term trial history information (in this case, the prediction error of 
congruency) to reduce its weight in predicting conflict level, resulting in a negative 
modulation. At trial i, this modulation can be formulated as a three-way interaction 
vector ,v × f × o, which is the product of volatility and the prediction error of 
congruency ,f × o (see section 4.1.5.5). Using the univariate analysis described above, I 
found negative three-way interaction in 63 (P < 0.05) out of the 73 caudate searchlights 
that displayed distributed encoding of predicted conflict level (Figure 15d,e). 
Accordingly, across these caudate searchlights, the mean effect of the three-way 
interaction was significantly negative (t7S = -4.63, P = 0.0002). The pattern of this 
interaction confirmed the prediction of increased suppression of prediction error in 
more stable conditions (Figure 15f). Importantly, the distinct coding schemes between 
volatility’s modulation on prediction error (homogeneous encoding) and predicted 
conflict level (distributed encoding) suggest that the results are unlikely to be caused by 
intrinsic correlation between the variable and the 3-way interaction vectors.  
4.2.4 Predicted Conflict Level-mediated Cognitive Control in the PFC 
In our model, after predicted conflict level is updated following the most-recent 
observation, conflict prediction guides the application of cognitive control (Figure 16a), 
i.e., titrating attentional selectivity based on the anticipated conflict level. This process 
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should be reflected in a negative two-way interaction between predicted conflict level 
and observed congruency, due to higher activation when observed conflict was higher 
than predicted. In other words, the more unexpected an incongruent trial is (e.g., 
incongruent trials following a congruent trial (M. Botvinick et al., 1999), incongruent 
trials in a block of mostly congruent trials (Sohn et al., 2000)), the more control effort 
should be required for resolving conflict. Thus, we hypothesize that within unexpected 
incongruent trials (where predicted conflict level, or the estimated probability that the 
forthcoming trial was incongruent, was less than 0.5), the predicted conflict level should 
mediate cognitive control in a manner that trials with higher predicted conflict levels 
(i.e., a better match between predicted and observed conflict) should elicit less activation 
than trials with lower predicted conflict levels (i.e., a poor match between anticipated 
and observed conflict), resulting in a negative co-variation between predicted conflict 
level and activation level. We observed this signature of cognitive control in the right 
dorsal ACC and left caudal dlPFC (Figure 16b, c, P < 0.05, corrected). Of note, these 
results are unlikely to be caused by encoding of the predicted conflict level per se, 
because no encoding of predicted conflict level was found in the reported regions in the 
previous analyses (see above), and the direction of the negative co-variance is opposite 
to that of the activation patterns reported above, where higher activation was associated 
with higher predicted conflict level and higher conflict (Niendam et al., 2012) (e.g., 
incongruent trials). 
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Figure 16: Modulation of predicted conflict level on cognitive control. (a) A 
graphical representation of the Bayesian model, highlighting in red the information 
processing mechanisms related to the mediation of predicted conflict level on 
cognitive control. (b) Centers of searchlights in the ACC (left) and dlPFC (right) 
regions showing significant (P < 0.05, corrected) negative co-variation between 
predicted conflict level and activation elicited by unexpected incongruent trials. (c) 
Activation in the ACC ROI (left) and the dlPFC ROI (right), plotted as a function of 
predicted conflict level.  The dotted lines show the linear trend lines. (d) The 
individual co-variation coefficient between predicted conflict level and RT, plotted as 
a function of individual co-variation coefficient between predicted conflict level and 
activation level in the dlPFC cluster in (b). 
It also follows from our model that the modulation of predictive conflict level on 
cognitive control should be reflected in behavioral performance data: participants who 
compensate better for the underestimated conflict level in unexpected incongruent trials 
in neural terms (i.e., showing a stronger negative co-variation between predicted conflict 
level and neural “control” activation level) should also show less behavioral conflict  in 
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unexpected incongruent trials (i.e., less negative co-variation between predicted conflict 
level and RT). This predicts a data pattern where the co-variation coefficient between 
predicted conflict level and neural activation level is negatively correlated with the co-
variation coefficient between predicted conflict level and RT across subjects. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, we observed such a negative correlation in the left caudal dlPFC 
cluster identified above  (Fig. 4d, r = -0.57, P = 0.007) . This correlation was not significant 
in the ACC cluster (r = 0.06, n.s.), however. 
4.2.5 Prediction Error-driven Updating of Volatility in the Insula 
After current-trial congruency is observed, the model’s volatility estimate needs 
to be updated to further guide the adjustment of predicted conflict level (Figure 17a). 
The model updates volatility based on the prediction error of congruency. Hence, 
according to our model, brain regions encoding volatility should also be expected to 
represent congruency prediction error. As noted above, the representation of the 
prediction error of congruency was tested for using the interaction vector of predicted 
conflict level and observed congruency	,f& × T&. Compatible with the above prediction, a 
cluster of searchlights showing significant predicted conflict level × congruency effect 
was found in the left insula (Figure 17b, corrected). This cluster overlaps the insula 
cluster of searchlights encoding volatility (Figure 14), within which 24 out of 73 
searchlights also showed encoding of prediction error of congruency (Fig. 5c, P < 0.05). 
Accordingly, across the searchlights in the left insula ROI encoding belief of volatility 
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(Figure 14), the mean representation of congruency prediction error was significant (t7S 
= -2.13, P = 0.045).  
 
Figure 17: Congruency prediction error drives the updating of volatility. (a) A 
graphical representation of the Bayesian model, highlighting in red the information 
processing mechanisms related to the updating of volatility. (b) Visualization of 
searchlights showing encoding of volatility (red, P < 0.05 corrected) and searchlights 
showing interaction between predicted conflict level and congruency (green, P < 0.05 
corrected) and their overlap (yellow). (c) Histogram of t-values measuring group level 
univariate effect of volatility × predicted error of congruency interaction. The t-values 
were calculated from searchlights in the volatility-encoding cluster shown in (b). The 
red vertical line denotes the threshold for statistical significance (P < 0.05). 
4.3 Discussion  
In the present fMRI study, the Bayesian model was employed to guide the 
investigation of the neural substrates underlying the flexible adjustment of cognitive 
control. Specifically, the neural encoding of the three model variables (volatility, 
predicted conflict level and congruency) were inspected, then three model predictions 
(volatility modulates the updating of predicted conflict level; predicted conflict level 
mediates cognitive control, and the prediction error of congruency drives the updating 
of volatility) were examined using the estimates of model variables and fMRI data. 
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The conflict monitoring theory claims that the brain tracks the conflict level via 
reinforcement learning with a fixed learning rate (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001). As 
shown above, reinforcement learning is unable to account for the flexible adjustment of 
cognitive control. Facilitated by the Bayesian model, I found that the model estimates of 
predicted conflict level were represented in the caudate. Crucially, the predicted conflict 
level was encoded by a distributed coding scheme, which suggests that the predicted 
conflict level is represented by its statistical distribution across neuronal groups, with 
each group’s activation encoding the current belief of the predicted conflict level at a 
specific level. This finding opens the possibility that the predicted conflict level is 
monitored by a more sophisticated statistical approach (i.e., by its statistical distribution) 
compared to the claim that the conflict level is encoded using only one scalar value. The 
parallel circuits in the caudate provide the structural and functional foundations of 
estimating and updating a representation of statistical distribution (G. E. Alexander & 
Crutcher, 1990; Frank & O'Reilly, 2006). Moreover, the results support the hypothesis 
that volatility modulates the updating of predicted conflict level in the caudate. 
Specifically, volatility belief regulates the dependence on short-term information (e.g., 
the learning rate in a reinforcement learning algorithm) and modulates the 
representation of short-term information (e.g., the prediction error of congruency). These 
findings shed light on the mechanisms of flexibly predicting the conflict level (or 
control-demand), which is then employed to adaptively guide cognitive control. 
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Previous studies defined the adjustment of cognitive control as a function of 
change in a specific context, such as the previous trial congruency (M. Botvinick et al., 
1999; Durston et al., 2003; Egner & Hirsch, 2005a, 2005b; Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004) 
and the proportion incongruency (Grandjean et al., 2012; Krug & Carter, 2012; Sohn et 
al., 2000; Wilk et al., 2012). The present study defines the adjustment of cognitive control 
as a function of change in predicted conflict level, which is an integration of both 
contexts, and more broadly, of both short-term and long-term information regarding 
demands on cognitive control. The predicted conflict level was found to mediate the 
interference effect in ACC and dlPFC. Similar to the conflict adaptation and proportion 
incongruency effects, the activation profiles of these regions suggest augmented 
cognitive control (reflected by reduced interference effect) as the predicted conflict level 
increases. As key regions in monitoring conflict and adaptively applying top-down 
biasing to posterior regions, trial history-based modulation on interference effects have 
commonly been reported in ACC (Barch et al., 2001; M. Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et 
al., 1998; Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald et al., 2000; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000) and 
dlPFC (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald et al., 2000). The model-
based analysis further suggests that the source of the modulation in ACC and dlPFC 
might be a prediction of conflict level signal, which originates in the caudate and is 
estimated adaptively across changing contexts via a sophisticated statistical learning 
mechanism.  
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The encoding of volatility was found in bilateral anterior insula cortices and 
adjacent inferior frontal gyri. A previous study has shown that the anterior insula cortex 
displayed higher activation in decision-making involving ambiguity (unknown 
probabilistic distribution of reward) than that involving known probabilistic distribution 
of reward (Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006). Ambiguity (or uncertainty) 
of underlying probabilistic distribution is similar to volatility in that volatility quantifies 
the likelihood the underlying probabilistic distribution varies (in other words, become 
uncertain). The model further predicts that the updating of volatility relies on the 
predicted error of congruency, which was also found encoded in the left anterior insula 
cortex in this study. Prediction-error related activation in the anterior insula was also 
reported in another study of risky decision making (Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 
2008) in the anterior insula. Moreover, a recent theory of the function of anterior insula 
cortex also supports the encoding of volatility and its updating: Craig (2009) claims that 
a generic function of anterior insular is to integrate salience across various factors (e.g., 
the structure of the task) to form a representation of awareness at a given moment. 
According to that model, the salience of any factor is determined by its contribution to 
the homeostasis of factors. Thus, volatility and prediction error of congruency, as 
measures reflecting potential violation of homeostasis of one’s belief of the probabilistic 
distribution of conflict level, would feasibly be encoded in the anterior insula according 
to this model. Moreover, Craig (2009) proposes that a representation of awareness in a 
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“finite present” (a present-centered period of time) is generated from the representations 
of awareness via temporal integration, which can potentially support the temporal 
updating of volatility.   
In sum, facilitated by the Bayesian model, the present fMRI study extends the 
classic conflict monitoring model (M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001; M. M. Botvinick et al., 
2004) to account for the flexible adjustment of cognitive control. Instead of estimating a 
fixed learning strategy to predict conflict level, the present model-based analyses 
revealed the involvement of anterior insula in encoding control-demand volatility, 
which modulates the updating of predicted conflict level, and the involvement of the 
caudate, which provides a flexible learning system to predict conflict level. These 
findings depict an orchestra of various systems that adaptively adjust cognitive control 
to maintain optimal behavior. 
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5. Summary 
In this section, I first summarize the major findings of the present dissertation in 
section 5.1, organized according to the relationship between 4 factors: the experimental 
design, the Bayesian model, the behavioral data and the fMRI data. Related works and 
their links to this dissertation are also discussed. I then point out some limitations of this 
dissertation and some open topics that future studies might tackle in section 5.2. 
5.1 General Discussion 
In this dissertation, I investigated potential mechanisms supporting the flexibility 
of adjustments in cognitive control, allowing us to adapt to environments with varying 
patterns of conflict (and thus, varying control-demand). I argue that this flexibility can 
be explained by a mechanism that gauges volatility, which determines how information 
sampled from various temporal scales should be integrated to optimally predict the 
demand of cognitive control. This mechanism was then formulated in a Bayesian model 
that simulated control processes and task performance on a trial-by-trial basis. Prior to 
the onset of the stimulus at each trial, volatility regulates the prediction of conflict level, 
which is in turn involved in determining the demand for cognitive control. After the 
stimulus is presented, the perceived congruency of the stimulus updates the belief of 
volatility and predicted conflict level. This prediction-update loop repeats for each trial 
and produces trial-by-trial estimates of volatility and predicted conflict level.  
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Figure 18: An illustration showing the order of different “components” being 
integrated into this dissertation to investigate flexible adjustment of cognitive 
control. 
Starting with this model, I conducted a series of studies to investigate the 
mechanism of flexible adjustment of cognitive control by successively including 
additional “components” in each chapter (Figure 18). These added components validate 
the model and/or provide new evidence of the mechanisms underlying the flexibility of 
the adjustment of cognitive control. The model was first validated using an experimental 
design that manipulated the reliability of short-term and long-term information by 
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varying the frequency of alternating two underlying proportion incongruency 
distributions (section 2.2.3). Then I demonstrated that the proposed model 
simultaneously accounts for two classic behavioral phenomena in cognitive control that 
are believed to have different reliance on short-term and long-term trial-history (section 
3.1). In particular, the behavioral studies in sections 3.2 and 3.3 indicated that (1) the 
experimental design was able to elicit behavioral change related to flexible adjustment of 
cognitive control and (2) that the behavioral changes could be accounted for by the 
Bayesian model. They also lay the foundations for an fMRI study (chapter 4), which 
employed the Bayesian model and the same experimental design to guide the 
exploration of neural substrates of flexible cognitive control. Compared to the conflict 
monitoring model and the dual mechanisms model of cognitive control, the Bayesian 
model is more parsimonious (e.g., using a single mechanism to account for different 
behavioral phenomena) and more appropriate (e.g., using one-the-fly simulation rather 
than post-hoc fitting). Taken together, the success of the Bayesian model provides 
evidence to support the existence of a unified system for flexible adjustment of cognitive 
control. In the following sections, I extend these findings and discuss their potential 
relation to other works. 
5.1.1 How “Bayesian” is Cognitive Control? 
According to Bowers & Davis (2012), there are three levels at which one can use 
Bayesian methods in modeling cognitive processes: as computational tools, for 
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generating “optimal” benchmarks for cognitive processes, and for modeling the actual 
neural computations carried out by the brain. The Bayesian models reviewed above in 
this dissertation, along with the proposed Bayesian model, all operate at the second 
level: these Bayesian models were treated as “optimal observers”, and produced optimal 
predictions, which in turn were used to account for behavior and neuroimaging data. 
Using the estimates generated by the “optimal observer”, behavioral data and neural 
activity involved in the flexible adjustment of cognitive control can be accounted for. For 
example, volatility and predicted conflict level were represented in the dlPFC and 
caudate, respectively (chapter 4). The neuroimaging results further revealed a chain of 
modulation from volatility to predicted conflict level, and then to impact of observed 
congruency. These results support the argument that the brain adjusts cognitive control 
through the information flow as envisaged in the proposed Bayesian model. 
If the brain processes information related to cognitive control in a Bayesian (or 
more broadly, a predictive statistical) approach, two more premises must be met. First, 
the variables (e.g., volatility, predicted conflict level) should be represented as 
probabilistic variables. In other words, the encoding of these variables should be in the 
form of probabilistic distributions rather than a scalar value. Second, the updating of 
variable states should be computed on probabilistic distributions. The first premise 
requires neurons encoding the variables to either perform distributed encoding (e.g., 
each neuron represents the probabilistic density at a given value) or to have the ability of 
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swiftly change tuning curves to accommodate the updating of the probabilistic 
distribution. Regarding the second premise, the updating on probabilistic distribution 
requires at least two variables (e.g., a variable to be updated, and other variable(s) 
providing the information to update) and hence is performed on a joint probabilistic 
distribution that has a dimension of at least two (one for each variable). Because 
homogeneous encoding can only represent one-dimensional information, the second 
premise predicts distributed encoding.   
Following this logic, the distributed representation of predicted conflict level 
found in the fMRI study supports both of these premises, and thus the proposal of 
Bayesian implementation of cognitive control in the brain. Yet, fMRI findings of 
homogeneous (univariate) encoding may not represent unambiguous support for 
homogeneous coding due to the coarse spatial resolution of fMRI. For instance, it is 
possible that a voxel covers a population of neurons that encodes a statistical variable 
and in a distributed fashion, and thus the fMRI signal of that voxel exhibits a pattern of 
homogeneous encoding. Neuronal recording or other techniques with higher spatial 
resolution than fMRI are needed for a more accurate test of these premises. 
Previous studies are promising in this regard. At the neuronal level, it has been 
shown that Bayesian models can account for neural firing rate data in decision making 
(Beck et al., 2008) and attention (Rao, 2005)  tasks. Thus the brain might adopt the neural 
implementation of those Bayesian models to support flexible cognitive control. 
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5.1.2 Actor-critic Models 
Several prior computational models have employed an “actor-critic” architecture 
to simulate neural responses in the ACC (W. H. Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti, 
Alexander, Verguts, & Brown, 2013; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011, 2013).  The 
“actor-critic” architecture consists of two components, an “actor” component and a 
“critic” component. During the simulation in a time-step, these models first make 
prediction of the stimulus/outcome using the actor component. The discrepancy 
between the prediction and the actual stimulus/outcome is processed by the critic 
component to update the actor component’s prediction in the next time-step. Using the 
reinforcement learning algorithm driven by unsigned prediction error, these models are 
able to account for ACC activity in a variety of tasks.  
The Actor-critic models and the proposed Bayesian model are similar in a few 
ways: Firstly, they share the two-step algorithm that first predicts the stimulus/outcome 
and then updates the prediction based on prediction error. Secondly, they all assume 
that this update (or learning) should be flexible. Specifically, the predicted response-
outcome (PRO) model (W. H. Alexander & Brown, 2011) adjusts the learning rate based 
on prediction error. The reward value prediction model (Silvetti et al., 2011; Silvetti, 
Seurinck, et al., 2013), although adopting a fixed learning rate, argues that the 
adjustment of learning rate may occur in the locus coeruleus. The proposed Bayesian 
model regulates learning via volatility. Lastly, all of the models predict larger prediction 
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error-related activity in the ACC in more volatile conditions. This prediction was 
validated by the finding of significant positive 3-way interaction in the ACC reported in 
the fMRI study above.  
Despite these similarities, the actor-critic models and the proposed Bayesian 
model also differ in some essential aspects. One key difference is the explicit 
consideration of volatility. The actor-critic models argue that a dedicated variable of 
volatility is unnecessary, because learning can be modulated directly via prediction 
error. On the contrary, Bayesian model explicitly includes a variable of volatility to 
modulate the update of predicted conflict level. In support of the contention that the 
brain computes the volatility of control-demand, the fMRI study presented in this 
dissertation found an anterior insula/IFG region that represented the time course of 
volatility estimates produced by the Bayesian model, as well as an interaction between 
volatility estimate and prediction error of congruency. Additionally, the PRO model 
predicts that learning rate increases as prediction error increases, whereas in the 
proposed Bayesian model the opposite is true. Future studies are needed to reconcile 
this discrepancy.   
5.1.3 Predictive Coding 
The predict-update approach used in the Bayesian model also relates it to the 
predictive coding theory of information processing in the brain (Friston, 2005; Mumford, 
1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999), which states that information processing is facilitated by top-
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down modulation based on prediction, and that prediction error is transmitted bottom-
up to update the prediction to improve its accuracy. The updating of prediction is a 
crucial part in the predictive coding theory, because the efficiency of the update directly 
affects the performance of future information processing. It has been shown that this 
update can be modulated by attention, which boosts prediction error to enhance the 
efficiency of learning (Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2013). The Bayesian model, with the 
variable of volatility, may suggest an additional mechanism that could improve learning 
in the predictive coding framework. Specifically, volatility reflects the likelihood that 
prediction error is due to a fundamental change in the environment and it thus 
determines the influence of prediction error on the updating. In the implementation of 
the Bayesian model, volatility regulates the update from prediction error by modulating 
the likelihood of the new prediction deviating from its previous state, which has a 
similar effect as modulating learning rates in a reinforcement learning model, as 
demonstrated both in the validation (section 2.2.1) and neural data (section 4.3). Thus, in 
addition to attention amplifying prediction error, the effect of volatility demonstrates a 
complementary mechanism that can facilitate the updating from prediction error by 
modulating its utility.  
5.1.4 Volatility vs. Other 2nd-order Measures 
In the proposed Bayesian model, the function of volatility is to determine how 
likely the new predicted conflict level is to deviate from its previous state. Thus it can be 
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considered as a quantity of second-order uncertainty (e.g. the deviation of probability, 
see (Yu & Dayan, 2005)) that reflects the variance or SD of the distribution of predicted 
conflict level (although strictly speaking, volatility is not equivalent to SD in the 
Bayesian model because the SD of pf|f, v also depends on the previous state of 
predicted conflict level). Deviation of reward from its mean has been found to be 
encoded in posterior cingulate cortex neurons (McCoy & Platt, 2005). Another study has 
shown that in the primate anterodorsal septum, neural firing rates display an “inverted-
U” shape as a function of the probability of reward, peaking at 50% (Monosov & 
Hikosaka, 2013). Given that the SD of reward increases starting from 0 reward 
probability, then peaks at 50%, and finally drops until the probability of reward reaches 
100%, this inverted-U pattern of neural firing may also represent potential neural 
substrates of deviation and/or volatility. A similar neural firing pattern was also found 
in the midbrain (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003) and the ventral striatum (Preuschoff, 
Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006) in monkeys.  
Volatility is also associated with confidence (or uncertainty). For example, in a 
stable environment, prediction of conflict is usually more confident because the 
expectation is less likely to be violated. Previous studies have shown that confidence of 
decision is encoded in the lateral intraparietal cortex (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009) as well as 
ventral medial and rostrolateral prefrontal cortices (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & 
Dolan, 2013).  
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Finally, high volatility also arguably renders decision-making more ambiguous; 
hence neural substrates of ambiguity, as found in orbital frontal cortex (Hsu, Bhatt, 
Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005) and the lateral PFC (Huettel et al., 2006) may also 
contribute to encoding volatility.  
Although the brain regions supporting volatility-related encoding and 
modulation found in this dissertation (e.g., encoding of volatility in the anterior insula, 
and modulation involving volatility in the caudate) do not correspond closely to these 
previous findings, this dissertation extends those prior works in two ways: first, 
compared to previous studies that usually predicted the outcome of a particular 
stimulus-response ensemble, the current model was employed to predict the demand of 
cognitive control and thus extends the previous findings. Second, the trial-based 
analysis employed in this dissertation extends the time-resolution of the aforementioned 
studies from block- or condition-level to trial level. Thus the findings in this dissertation 
may reveal neural substrates underlying learning (of the predicted conflict level) at a 
finer temporal resolution.  Nevertheless, given the conceptually similarity between 
volatility and other 2nd-order statistical measures, these types of estimates might be 
supported by a generic mechanism that operates independent from specific task-
settings. This dissertation provides new materials for the exploration of this generic 
mechanism. 
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5.2 Limitation and Future Directions 
Although this Bayesian model has shown great potential in accounting for classic 
behavioral phenomena and exploring the neural substrates of flexible cognitive control, 
there are a few caveats that can be addressed in future studies. There are also some 
novel routes that are potentially interesting to take as follow-up investigations. In the 
following sections I discuss them in details. 
5.2.1 Within-trial Simulation 
In the studies reported in this dissertation, the Bayesian model only simulated 
cognitive control in an across-trial manner. Thus the dynamics of cognitive control 
within a trial remain unclear. It would be interesting to examine how the predicted 
conflict level modulates the resolution of conflict, and how the prediction error 
accumulates and guides the update of predicted conflict level and volatility within a 
trial, in particular when the prediction deviates from the actual congruency. Several 
considerations should be taken into account prior to embarking on such a project, 
however. Firstly, from the perspective of the Bayesian model, there may not be any 
change of the environment within a trial. Thus, a simplified model (e.g., without the 
variable of volatility or replacing the variable with a constant for volatility, assuming it 
stays the same during a trial) could feasibly be used for simulation. However, this is not 
to say that volatility has no effect on within-trial dynamics – only that this effect may not 
change within a single trial. Indeed, one could extract quantitative characteristics from 
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within-trial dynamics (e.g., speed of information accumulation, starting bias, and so on), 
and analyze them across trials as a function of volatility.  
Secondly, from the perspective of behavioral data analysis, within-trial modeling 
usually depends on distributions of RTs, which in turn requires large number of trials to 
ensure that the sample accurately reflects the underlying distribution (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2005; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999). This would increase the 
difficulty of data acquisition. Fortunately, data acquisition could be facilitated by AMT 
(see Appendix), as documented in section 3.3.  
Finally, from the perspective of the imaging methodology, the fMRI approach 
employed in this dissertation would be sub-optimal for studying the dynamics of 
within-trial brain activity at high temporal resolution compared to 
electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG) and invasive neural 
recordings. Future studies may therefore consider using these techniques in conjunction 
with the new Bayesian model to study flexible within-trial cognitive control at 
millisecond resolution. 
5.2.2 Meta-volatility? 
In the Bayesian model proposed here, the transition distribution of volatility 
depends on a parameter σ", which stays constant throughout the experiment. One way 
of comprehending the function of (^ is that it controls how fast volatility changes 
temporally. For example, volatility can remain high for a long time (low (^, e.g., remain 
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at 50% proportion incongruency for 200 trials) or volatility can vary between different 
values at low levels (high (^, e.g., alternate between 80% and 90% proportion 
incongruency every 20 trials). Thus (^ could also be considered an index of “meta-
volatility”. The proposed Bayesian model simply assumes that (^ is a constant within an 
experiment. However, in theory, to account for possible changes of speed of volatility, 
the model could include another variable of (^ that would depend on yet another 
variable to control the temporal change of (^, and so forth, ad infinitum. Consequently, 
this approach opens the door to a potential infinite regress, rendering a “complete” 
modeling the flexibility of cognitive control impossible.   
The key to this issue lies in how flexible cognitive control needs to be. The brain 
makes decision promptly, thus sometimes it sacrifices flexibility for efficiency (cf., the 
habitual S-R mappings described in chapter 1). Thus, although in theory the variables of 
volatility, meta-volatility and meta-meta-volatility (etc.) can be expanded to infinite 
levels, the brain does not need to implement all of these levels. To empirically test to 
which level the brain encodes information about control, a model comparison between 
the present Bayesian model and a Bayesian model that incorporates (^ as a variable 
could be conducted on data acquired using a task that manipulates the speed of the 
shifting of volatility. If adding the variable of meta-volatility cannot significantly 
improve the performance of the model in accounting for human data, it may be the case 
that the brain does not encode (^ as a variable. 
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5.2.3 Accounting for the Cost and Benefit of Cognitive Control 
The present Bayesian model simply assumes that the amount of control applied 
is linearly correlated with the predicted conflict level. Nevertheless, Shenhav, Botvinick 
& Cohen (2013) propose that the amount of control applied also depends on 
considerations the cost and benefit brought by engaging cognitive control. For example, 
in the gender Stroop task, one could apply little control in incongruent trials if the cost of 
applying control overweighs the gain of correctly responding to a stimulus. Given the 
high accuracy in the present studies, I assume that the subjects considered the cost-
benefit function to justify applying cognitive control at a sufficient level for performing 
near-perfectly in this relatively simple task. However, future studies could expand the 
Bayesian model by incorporating an optimization problem involving the predicted 
conflict level, as well as estimated costs and benefits of engaging cognitive control to test 
the relationship between predicted conflict level and applied control level under 
different difficulty/motivation settings. 
This route of future research can also help explain performance variability in 
cognitive control that exists between motivational states (Locke & Braver, 2008), between 
emotional states (Braem et al., 2013; Egner et al., 2008; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & 
Hirsch, 2006; Reeck & Egner, 2011) and across individuals (Burgess & Braver, 2010).  The 
current Bayesian model succeeded in modeling the mean behavior and brain activity in a 
group of subjects. Nevertheless, it is unable to account for the variance above because its 
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estimated states of variables are only based on the congruency variable. By introducing 
the costs and benefits of applying cognitive control, and thus dissociate the assessment 
of cognitive control from the prediction of conflict level, the extended model would have 
the potential to explain intra- and inter- individual variance. Similar to estimating the 
states of volatility and conflict level, the Bayesian model could in theory infer the states 
of the added variables, and inferred states can be applied to explore the mechanisms 
underlying behavioral and brain data. 
I speculate that, in a healthy population, most of the performance variance arises 
from the difference in the mapping from predicted conflict level to the amount of 
cognitive control applied. In other words, the predicted conflict level may be highly 
consistent across task-settings and subjects (e.g., people have similar estimates of the 
predicted conflict level), and the variance is more likely due to different cost functions 
(e.g., people differ in making decision of how much control to exert from the same 
predicted conflict level). 
5.2.4 Assessing the Causal Roles of Model Variables Using 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)  
One common limitation in neuroimaging study is the lack of a measure of the 
causal involvement of a given brain region in bringing about the subjects’ behavior. For 
example, from the fMRI study reported in chapter 4, one could only infer that volatility 
is encoded in the dlPFC because of the co-variation between brain activity in the dlPFC 
and the vector of volatility estimates. However, co-variation does not guarantee 
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causality. One way of showing causality is through TMS, which can temporarily inhibit 
a brain’s activation by applying a transient magnetic field over that region. Thus a 
possible future study could aim at impairing computations in the dlPFC using TMS and 
inspecting if this intervention compromise subjects’ performance in flexibly adjusting 
cognitive control.  
5.3 Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I propose a formal Bayesian model to account for the flexible 
adjustment of cognitive control in conflict tasks. Endowed by a volatility variable that 
adaptively regulates the influence of long-term and short-term trial history on the 
prediction of conflict level, this model successfully simulates several classic behavioral 
phenomena observed from the cognitive control literature, and furthermore facilitates a 
principled, model-guided investigation of the neural substrates underlying the flexible 
adjustment of cognitive control. Extended versions of the Bayesian model may also 
facilitate future investigations to reveal more details of the neuro-computational 
architecture of cognitive control, such as its within-trial dynamics, the relationship 
between prediction of conflict level and the implementation of cognitive control, and so 
on. Thus, I conclude that the Bayesian model provides a feasible solution to explain the 
mechanisms underlying the flexible adjustment of cognitive control.
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Appendix A 
A.1 An Introduction to Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
One major limitation in conducting behavioral studies in the lab is the long data 
acquisition time. This can be attributed to three reasons: First, the size of subject pool is 
typically relatively small (e.g., a few hundreds of potential participants) and subject to 
fluctuation (e.g., student subject pools are often unavailable during breaks). Second, the 
capacity of simultaneously testing several participants is often limited. Third, the hours 
during a day one can run behavioral studies are limited. As a result, a researcher often 
needs weeks or even months to recruit enough subjects for a single study. 
This inefficient data acquisition problem can be greatly mitigated by using AMT 
(https://www.mturk.com), an online cloud-sourcing platform. In the context of 
conducting a behavioral study, AMT serves as a “subject pool” where experimenters (or 
“requesters”, as AMT define them) can recruit volunteers to perform behavioral tasks 
online and compensate them via the AMT payment system. In 2011, the number of 
registered online subjects (or “workers”, as AMT define them) reached 500,000, 
providing a huge and stable source for subject recruitment. The online subjects perform 
tasks on their own web browsing devices, thus multiple subjects can work on the same 
task independently and simultaneously. The subjects are located across different time 
zones (http://techlist.com/mturk/global-mturk-worker-map.php) and can participate in a 
study anytime in the absence of direct interactions with the experimenter, so the data 
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acquisition can occur at any time. Overall, AMT can be utilized to vastly accelerate data 
acquisition for behavioral tasks. 
Despite of AMT’s great potential in facilitating behavioral studies, several 
concerns have been raised by researchers. Many of these concerns stem from two core 
issues, either regarding the subjects or the techniques implementing the behavioral 
tasks.  
A major concern about the subjects is how well they perform the tasks. This 
concern can be further decomposed into two more specific ones, namely: (1) Do the 
subjects understand the instructions? And (2) are they motivated enough to follow the 
instructions throughout a task? For (1), most AMT workers are located in the United 
States and India (Ipeirotis, 2010), both of whose primary languages are English. Thus 
most subjects should be able to understand instructions written in English. One can also 
add country of residence to the recruitment criteria to further filter out non-English 
speakers from participation. Moreover, AMT encourages requesters to provide previews 
of their tasks for workers to decide if they would like to sign up. The preview can also be 
used as a practice session to test if the subjects follow the instructions. For (2), AMT 
workers are generally motivated to follow the instructions and finish a task once they 
sign up, because they are paid by the quality of their work (i.e., they may not be 
compensated if they perform poorly), according to AMT’s payment policy (Institutional 
Review Board at Duke also honors this policy).  In addition, rejection of payment may 
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also impede a worker’s qualification of performing future tasks. There have also been 
some studies (see the studies reviewed below, as well as the study reported in section 
3.2) showing that most online subjects follow the instructions and complete behavioral 
tasks with high accuracy. 
 A second common concern is that the demographics of the subjects may differ 
from that of the general population. In fact, a recent study points out that the AMT 
online subjects population has demographics similar to that of the whole American 
online population (http://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2009/03/turker-
demographics-vs-internet.html). Compared to the student subject pools many 
researchers use, AMT subjects form a more diverse group in terms of age, education, 
races, ethics, and so on. Thus, in theory the AMT results should in fact be more 
generalizable. 
Because the rules of most behavioral tasks are relatively simple, one may worry 
that some workers can use some software to perform the task rather that doing it 
themselves. This is a highly unlikely scenario, because most cognitive tasks (e.g., 
identify the gender of a face image) are still too difficult for computer programs to 
accomplish. Furthermore, the rules and stimulus sets vary significantly across tasks, 
making it almost impossible to develop a generic software package for all behavioral 
tasks. Even developing a computer program that solves a single task may require 
significantly more time than needed in completing that task in person. 
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Another concern regarding the subjects is how to prevent one subject from 
participating in the same task more than once. AMT’s policy restricts that each worker 
account can only sign up for a task once. However, it is possible that some workers with 
multiple worker accounts perform some relatively profitable tasks more than once. To 
reduce this possibility, one can record the IP address for each participant and block 
multiple participants from one IP address. 
Many behavioral tasks rely on precise timing of stimuli presentation and 
response recording, so some researchers may worry that running tasks online may 
compromise the precision of timing. The precision of timing depends on the 
implementation of the behavioral task. For example, in the implementation of the gender 
variant of the Stroop task (see below), subjects downloaded all stimuli and programs 
and run the task locally in their web browsers. Thus the timing was not affected by the 
speed of internet connection. Current industry standard requires modern web browsers 
to support timing that is “accurate to a thousandth of a millisecond” 
(http://www.w3.org/TR/hr-time/#sec-DOMHighResTimeStamp). Hence it is possible to 
achieve highly precise timing.  
One last concern is the uncontrolled apparatus. For example, a task can be 
performed by online subjects using various screen/window sizes, and input devices with 
different lags. The subjects may even be distracted from the task. These uncontrolled 
factors may cause a larger amount of noise in data acquired via AMT than in controlled 
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lab settings. This caveat can be alleviated by including more subjects. More important, 
from a different perspective, these uncontrolled factors indeed eliminates the possibility 
that some significant effects are caused by nuisance factors such as the size of the 
stimuli, specific hardware, or even the way the experimenter gives instructions. In other 
words, significant effects observed from AMT data should be no less (if not more) 
generalizable compared to data acquired in the lab. 
To sum up, it has been shown that AMT is a legitimate tool for conducting 
behavioral studies in general. A couple of studies have further validated AMT 
specifically for cognitive control tasks. Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis  (2013) examined 
online workers’ performance on Stroop, task-switching and Flanker tasks. Each task 
contained 96 trials and lasted approximately 5 minutes. Sixty subjects participated in 
each task. Subject attrition rate ranged from 10% to 33%. Both the error rate and RT 
showed at least marginally significant interference effects in Stroop and Flanker tasks. In 
the task-switching task, there are significant switching effects (repeat < switch) in both 
error rate and RT. These patterns replicate their classic versions of these 3 tasks. 
Weissman, Jiang & Egner (submitted) investigated the conflict adaptation effect using a 
prime-probe task conducted on AMT. The task contained 388 trials and lasted around 20 
minutes. Forty-five subjects were included. The subject attrition rate is low (4%). They 
also found significant interference effects. In addition, RT showed a significant conflict 
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adaptation effect, which is similar to another study conduct in the lab using the same 
design (Schmidt & Weissman, Submitted). 
These two studies paved the road to investigating effects in cognitive control via 
AMT. To further illustrate that AMT is also suitable to inspect the flexibility of cognitive 
control, the next section reports a behavioral study conducted via AMT using the same 
design as the study reported in section 3.2. 
A.2 Running the Flexible Cognitive Control Task on AMT 
A.2.1 Subjects 
Ninety subjects gave informed consent online in accordance with institutional 
guidelines and participated in this study through AMT. Six subjects were excluded from 
analysis due to random level accuracy. The remaining 84 subjects self-reported 
demographic information online (46 females; mean age, 31).  
A.2.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
The stimuli and procedure used in this study were used as the ones described 
above in section 3.3.2.  
A.2.3 Experimental Design 
The task and its design were used as the ones described above in section 3.2.3. 
A.2.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis was as the ones described above in section 3.2.4. 
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A.3 Comparison between Lab Data and AMT Data 
The online subjects achieved high accuracy during this task (mean accuracy = 
0.948 ± 0.005), suggesting the followed the instructions. As can be seen in Table 3, both 
the mean accuracy and mean RT were comparable between this study and the 
laboratory-based study described in section 3.2.5. Statistical analysis on RT further 
revealed that the AMT data yielded comparable results on several effects, including 
significant interference effect (J,O_ = 81.1, P < 0.001) due to longer RTs in incongruent 
trials (568 ± 18 ms) than in congruent trials (523 ± 16 ms), and proportion incongruency 
effect (J,O_ = 18.0, P < 0.001) driven by a larger interference effect in 80% congruency 
blocks (57 ±7 ms) than in 20% congruency blocks (32 ± 5 ms), and marginally significant 
main effect of volatility in RT (J,O_ = 3.6, P = 0.06), driven by slower RT in volatile runs 
(553 ± 19 ms) than in stable runs (539 ± 16 ms).  
Finally, in the 3-way ANOVA on RT, non-significant effects in the data from 
section 3.2 were also non-significant in the AMT data. These results strongly support 
that AMT is capable of acquiring legitimate behavioral data for tasks on flexible 
cognitive control.  
Table 1: Comparison of results between AMD data and lab data 
 AMT data Data from section 3.2 
Number of subjects 84 46 
Mean accuracy 94.8% 92.8% 
Mean RT 545 ms 535 ms 
RT: interference effect 44 ms (P < 0.001) 28 ms (P < 0.001) 
RT: proportion incongruency effect 25 ms (P < 0.001) 10 ms (P = 0.002) 
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RT: main effect of volatility 6 ms (P = 0.06) 10 ms (P = 0.04) 
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